THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT IN
1990: MORE FREEDOM FOR THE
GOVERNMENT; LESS
INFORMATION FOR THE
PUBLIC
SEAN

I.

E. ANDRUSSIER

INTRODUCTION

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was enacted in 1966 to
provide American citizens with a mechanism to gain access to federal
"agency records." 1 The essence of the FOIA is to require federal government agencies to disclose "agency records" upon request to "any person"
2
requesting those records, subject to nine enumerated exemptions. Most
of the litigation arising under the FOIA involves the scope of the exemptions. In 1990, broad judicial construction of Supreme Court decisions
and various FOIA exemptions narrowed the reach of the FOIA's
mandatory disclosure provisions, thereby curtailing the American public's ability to gain access to federal agency records. Additionally, in
1990 a majority of federal agencies responding to a Department of Justice (DOJ) survey indicated that they oppose a general application of the
FOIA to electronic records. In light of Congress's failure to amend the
FOIA to include explictly public access to such records, American citizens will continue to encounter opposition when they attempt to gain
access to electronic records.
Part II of this Note examines the judicial developments that occurred under the FOIA in 1990. Part II(A) examines the impact of the
Supreme Court's 1989 landmark decision, Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,3 in the lower courts. This
section argues that the lower courts are perhaps reading Reporters Committee too broadly, and in the process are unnecessarily curtailing public
access to agency records. Part II(B) discusses the most significant deci-4
sion rendered under the FOIA in 1990, New York Times Co. v. NASA,
and its potential to substantially reduce access under FOIA Exemption
1.
2.
3.
4.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
See iL §§ (a)(3), (b).
489 U.S. 749 (1989).
920 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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6. 5 Part II(C) discusses two decisions by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit that appear to frustrate Congressional intent by creating a virtual "irrebuttable" presumption in favor of the gov6
ernment under Exemption 7(D).
Part III examines the results of a 1990 DOJ survey of seventy federal agencies regarding the application of the FOIA to agency records
maintained in electronic form. This section notes the significance of the
survey results in light of the absence of express language in the FOIA
concerning the FOIA's application to electronic information. Part IV
evaluates a bill passed by the House of Representatives in 1990 that
would indirectly affect the FOIA in the context of electronic records by
virtue of policies articulated in the accompanying report-policies favoring public access to electronic records. Additionally, the bill would directly amend the FOIA by shifting administrative guidance of the FOIA
from the DOJ to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
II.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS

A.
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press
Although the Supreme Court did not render any decisions under the
FOIA in 1990, perhaps the dominant judicial theme in 1990 was the impact of the 1989 landmark Supreme Court decision,
The Court held, in
determining the applicability of Exemption 7(C),8 that the government
may categorically deny FOIA requests for "rap sheets." 9 In addition,
the Court held that when requested records "can reasonably be expected
to invade [a] citizen's privacy," 10 the records must shed light on the operations of the United States government to be subject to disclosure; the
request cannot serve merely the interests of a particular requester.H
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988).
6. Id. § 552(b)(7)(D).
see Note,
7. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). For an in-depth discussion
1990 DUKE L.J. 1113, 1121-30 [hereinafter

8. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1988).
489 U.S. at 780. The D.C. Circuit defined "rap sheets" as "FBI
records on individuals whose fingerprints have been submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests
and, in certain instances, employment, naturalization and military service. A rap sheet typically
contains information concerning an individual's arrests, indictments, convictions and imprisonments, and a notation of the source of the information." Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press
v. Department of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 732 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
489 U.S. at 780.
10.

11.

at 775.
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The Court's decision to categorically exempt rap sheets from the
mandatory disclosure provisions is significant because by categorically
exempting a certain type of information, that information cannot be disclosed regardless of its importance to a requester or to the general public.
The Court's requirement that information with the potential to invade
another's privacy must shed light on government operations is equally
significant, because not all requesters are able to demonstrate such a
weighty public interest even though the requested information may be of
extreme importance. Thus, Reporters Committee restricts access to
agency records by making it easier for the government to withhold
information.
Courts have indicated a tendency to interpret Reporters Committee
broadly, applying the decision beyond rap sheets and Exemption 7(C) to
support and justify a broad construction of various FOIA exemptions.
As a result, the public's ability to utilize the FOIA is substantially hampered. The impact of Reporters Committee is significant because, as the
legislative history of the FOIA and the courts make clear, FOIA exemptions should be construed narrowly to assure maximum disclosure of
agency information. 12
1. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press. Reporters Committee involved a dispute concerning the
scope of FOIA Exemption 7(C).13 Exemption 7(C) permits agencies to
withhold "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such [materials] ...
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy ... , 14 Prior to Reporters Committee, courts that determined the applicability of Exemption 7(C) required simply an identification and subsequent balancing of the relevant privacy interests in
nondisclosure with the public interest in gaining access to that information. This balancing was performed on a case-by-case basis to determine
if disclosure "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy." 15 If the public interest/privacy interest
balance favored privacy (i.e., the public interest in gaining access to the
information was not so important as to justify the personal privacy invasion), then the government was not required to disclose requested agency
records. Furthermore, if there was no public interest in accessing the
12. See, eg., Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1988).
14. Id. Thus, Exemption 7(C) protects the privacy of individuals whose names or other personal information appears in a requested record.
15. See Lesar v. Department of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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information, even a less-than-substantial invasion of privacy would be
deemed sufficient to prevent disclosure. 16 The range of acceptable public
interests to justify disclosure, however, was generally broad; many courts
would consider the requester's alleged interest in the request (as opposed
17
to some larger, more truly "public," interest).
In Reporters Committee, the Court adopted two approaches that significantly altered the traditional Exemption 7(C) calculus, thereby expanding the ability of the government to withhold agency records under
the FOIA. First, the Court narrowed the scope of the public interest that
will balance against alleged privacy interests. 18 If an alleged public interest does not satisfy the Court's new standard, then it cannot be balanced
against privacy interests; the invasion will be unjustified and the requested information may be withheld. If the public interest does satisfy
the Court's standard, it may be balanced against the privacy interests to
determine if disclosure is unwarranted.
Second, the Court utilized a categorical balancing approach, essentially by finding that the disclosure of rap sheets, by their very nature,
would always constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
under Exemption 7(C). 19 In doing so, the Court stated in dicta that cate20
gorical decisions "may be appropriate" in certain circumstances.
Lower courts have interpreted this language to justify categorical decisionmaking in certain circumstances not specifically authorized by the
Court. Thus, those courts will not balance public and private interests in
their disclosure determinations.
In formulating this departure from traditional Exemption 7(C) analysis, the Court first concluded, not surprisingly, that the subjects of rap
sheets have a substantial privacy interest in their criminal histories. 21
Next, the Court considered whether the invasion of personal privacy
would be unwarranted,2 2 announcing that "whether an invasion of privacy is warranted cannot turn on the purposes for which the request for
information is made." 2 3 Thus, the identity of the requesting party is ir16. See King v. Department of Justice, 586 F. Supp. 286, 294 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 830 F.2d
210 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
17. Cf Ditlow v. Schultz, 517 F.2d 166, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (in the context of Exception 6,
public interest considerations cannot be limited to monitoring federal government).
18. See Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
772-75 (1989).
19. See id. at 776-81.
20. See id. at 776.
21. Id. at 771.
22. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1988).
23. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 771.
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relevant to a determination of whether a court should grant a FOIA
request. 24
Instead, the Court posited a new; more stringent public interest requirement by concluding that whether an invasion of privacy is warranted is contingent upon "the nature of the requested document and its
relationship to 'the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act to
open agency action.to the light ofpublic scrutiny.' "25 Such a public interest standard, explained the Court, is consistent with the FOIA's policy to
provide citizens with the right to be informed about "what their govern26
ment is up to."

Having substantially narrowed the scope of the public interest required to refute an agency's Exemption 7(C) claim, the Court went one
step further. Instead of simply permitting the government to withhold
the rap sheets (since they would fail to shed light on government operations), the Court adopted a categorical approach to dispose of rap sheet
requests, stating that "categorical decisions may be appropriate and individual circumstances disregarded when a case fits into a genus in which
the balance characteristically tips in one direction." 27 Consequently, the
Court held:
24. Id.; ef Schwaner v. Department of the Air Force, 898 F.2d 793, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(Exemption 2 case holding requester identity irrelevant to court's decision to order (as opposed to
deny) disclosure-depsite the fact that requester was an insurance agent requesting personnel names
and addresses as a source for future commissions).
25. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 772 (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425
U.S. 352, 372 (1976)) (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 773 (emphasis added). In light of the foregoing strict view of when an invasion of
privacy may be warranted under Exemption 7(C), the Court reasoned that in a typical case in which
a person seeks information about another citizen, the requester does not want to learn anything
about the conduct of the particular agency that possesses the requested records and a "response to
this request would not shed any light on the conduct of any Government agency or official." Id.
Consequently, although the rap sheet information requested by certain members of the media in
Reporters Committee might be "newsworthy," newsworthiness alone is an insufficientpublic interest.
It does not ensure that the government is subject to scrutiny. See id. at 774.
The Court recognized that if the requesters in Reporters Committee were entitled to the personal information in the rap sheets, then anyone, for whatever reason, also would be entitled to the
information. Id. at 775. This rule stems from the language of the FOIA, which states that "each
agency upon any request for records... shall make the records promptly available to anyperson." 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988) (emphasis added). For a discussion of how courts have utilized the "any
person" standard both to increase and to restrict information dissemination under the FOIA, see
The 'Any Person' Standard: A Double Edged Sword, AccEss RaP., Feb. 7, 1990, at 4, 6 (although
the "any person" language was placed in the FOIA to ensure use of the FOIA by anyone, cases such
as Reporters Committee cite the "any person" language to support the restriction of dissemination by
adopting worst-case scenarios of who could receive such information).
27. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 776. The Court of Appeals was concerned about a judge
balancing individual privacy interests and public interests in the disclosure of rap sheet information
on a case-by-case-basis. See id. This is an interesting concern, because judges balance such competing interests all the time.
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[A]s a categorical matter.., a third party's request for law enforcement records or information about a private citizen can reasonably be

expected to invade that citizen's privacy, and. . . when the request
seeks no "official information" about a Government agency, but
happens to be storing, the invamerely records that the Government
'2 8
sion of privacy is "unwarranted."

Thus, after ReportersCommittee, no ad hoc balancing is required when a
request involves another person's rap sheet; such records are categorically exempt from disclosure.
A survey of the decisions rendered under the FOIA in 1990 demonstrates that courts have interpreted and applied Reporters Committee to
broaden the scope of Exemption 7(C) and other FOIA exemptions,
thereby curtailing disclosure. This broadening has been achieved under
the two approaches posited in Reporters Committee: a strict public interest requirement, and the Court's use of categorical decisionmaking.
2. Categoricalbalancing: Narrowly applied or broadly authorized?
Although the Court utilized categorical balancing in Reporters Committee, it is unclear whether it intended to authorize that approach in the
lower courts or whether the analysis was limited to the facts presented in
that case-requests for the criminal history of another person. The use
of the categorical approach is controversial because it precludes the caseby-case review that Congress intended when drafting the FOIA, with its
goal of mandatory disclosure. 29 Nonetheless, lower courts have interpreted the Court's holding broadly, and have extended the categorical
approach beyond the facts underlying Reporters Committee.
Landano v. Departmentof Justice30 is an example of a lower court's
broad interpretation and application of Reporters Committee. Landano
involved a FOIA suit to compel the FBI to release information regarding
an FBI investigation into the murder of a police officer. 31 Plaintiff, who
28. Id. at 780.
29. The legislative history of the original enactment of the FOIA implies an intent for case-bycase review, which is arguably circumvented by categorical decisionmaking. Cf CLARIFYING AND
PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, S.REP.

No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) ("It is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests [of
freedom of information and rights of privacy], but it is not an impossible task either.... Success lies
in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places
emphasis on the fullest possible disclosure.") (emphases added); id. ("It is the purpose of [the FOIA]
...to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under
") (emphasis added); CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE
clearly delineatedstatutorylanguage ....
RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 (1966)
("The [appeal] proceedings [inthe federal courts] are to be de novo so that the court can consider the
propriety of withholding .... ).
30. 651 F. Supp. 502 (D.N.J. 1990).
31. Id. at 504.
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was convicted of felony murder as a result of the investigation, main-

tained that the requested files contained information that proved his innocence of murder, and that such information was withheld from him
and his counsel during his trial. 32 Relying on Exemption 7(C), the FBI
withheld the names of FBI special agents, FBI support employees, police
officers, and other third parties involved in the murder investigation, in33
cluding witnesses.
In determining whether the government was justified in withholding
the requested information under Exemption 7(C),34 the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey35 immediately referred to
Reporters Committee, stating:
[C]ertain types of information may, as a matter of law, be withheld from an applicant under what the Supreme Court has called "categorical balancing." In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court
sanctioned the practice of categorical balancing under exemption 7(C)
and other exemptions while holding that all rap sheet information not
requested 3by
its subject is exempt from FOIA disclosure under exemp6
tion 7(C).
Consequently, the Landano court concluded that Reporters Committee's
acceptance of categorical withholding "compelled" it to exempt categori37
cally the names of informants and undercover agents.
Reporters Committee, however, did not categorically exempt the
names of informants or undercover agents from disclosure. In Reporters
Committee, the Court was confronted with a somewhat narrow FOIA
request for the criminal history of a third-party private citizen.
Although the Court was dealing generally with a rap sheet, what the
plaintiff requested and what the Court found to be highly sensitive (in
terms of its inherent privacy implications) was information about the
subject of the requested rap sheet. Thus, it is arguable that, in light of the
sensitive nature of the request before the Court, the holding of Reporters
Committee should be interpreted narrowly: Courts may categorically ex38
empt criminal history information about the subjects of rap sheets.
32. Id

13 years had elapsed between the time of plaintiff's conviction and the FOIA suit.

33. Id at 506.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1988).
35. The FOIA provides that federal district courts have "jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from
withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld
." rd. § 552(a)(4)(B).
36. Landano, 751 F. Supp. at 506 (emphasis added).

37. Id. at 507.
38. The Supreme Court's opinion seemed to emphasize the nature of rap sheets and the potential damage caused by their disclosure. The Court did not hold that a categorical analysis should be
used as often as possible to prevent, or efficiently adjudicate, FOIA disputes. The Court's statement
that "categorical decisions may be appropriate," Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776 (1989), was purely dictum.
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Landano, however, did not limit its categorical analysis to the with-

holding of individual criminal history information about the subject of a
rap sheet. Rather, the court expanded Reporters Committee by adding

the names of FBI informants and undercover agents involved in an investigation to the list of categories of information exempt under Exemption

7(C). 39 Although its application to the facts of Landano may not seem
offensive, other courts could potentially create an unlimited list of types

of information that would never be accessible to the public. This would,
of course, run counter to the goal of the FOIA-maximum access-and

to Congress's intent to carve out a limited set of exemptions from that
policy.
Nevertheless, Landano's expansion of Reporters Committee is ar-

guably justified in light of the Supreme Court's general pronouncement
that "categorical decisions may be appropriate.., when a case fits into a

genus in which the balance characteristically tips in one direction. '"40 By
failing to specify which information should be categorically exempt, this
language can be read, as the Landano court read it, to authorize courts to
balance categorically at their discretion. 4 1 The Supreme Court did not,

however, expressly compel or authorize categorical balancing under

Indeed, support for a narrow interpretation of the Court's holding in Reporters Committee can
be implied from the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun. He stated that "the Court's use of
'categorical balancing' under Exemption 7(C) ...[was] not basically sound." Id. at 780-81 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Further, Justice Blackmun questioned whether the use of
categorical balancing would "run aground on occasion, such as in a situation where a rap sheet
discloses a congressional candidate's conviction of tax fraud ...." Id.
Justice Blackmun's opinion indicates that he believed that the majority's categorical analysis
was limited to the facts of Reporters Committee. It is arguable that if Justice Blackmun believed that
the majority was compelling or authorizing widespread categorical balancing, he surely would have
articulated a broader criticism than one aimed at the majority's use of categorical balancing for rap
sheets; he would not have simply focused on those situations in which disclosure of rap sheet information may be appropriate. If Justice Blackmun was troubled with the use of categorical balancing
in such an uncontroversial setting such as rap sheet requests, he probably would have been deeply
concerned with an authorization beyond the facts of Reporters Committee.
39. Landano, 751 F. Supp. at 509.
40. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 776.
41. Indeed, the Landano court believed that the Court's categorical balancing guidelines compelled the court to exempt the information, and that "the Supreme Court sanctioned the practice of
categorical balancing under Exemption 7(C) and other exemptions." 751 F. Supp. at 506 (emphases
added).
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7(C).42 Nevertheless, Reporters Committee's categorical balancing ap-

proach has surfaced even under Exemptions 643 and 7(D). 44
3. The scope of the public interest requirement after Reporters
Committee. Reporters Committee also limited the range of public interests that a court can consider when determining the merit of agency
withholding under Exemption 7(C). The Court held that when balancing under Exemption 7(C) the alleged public interest in accessing the
requested information against the potential invasion of personal privacy
that would occur if the information were disclosed, the only public interest that should enter the equation is one that would shed light on government operations. This new public interest requirement has significantly
restricted the disclosure of information under Exemption 7(C).
Arguably, the reasoning and holding of Reporters Committee concerning what constitutes a valid public interest for purposes of gaining
access to agency information should be limited to Exemption 7(C) analyses. In other words, plaintiffs making FOIA requests, in general, should
not have to demonstrate that the information they request will shed light
on government operations. Several courts, however, have demonstrated
a willingness to stretch the heightened public interest requirement be45
yond Exemption 7(C).
The argument that Reporters Committee's stringent public interest
standard should only be required under Exemption 7(C) begins with a
recognition that courts have consistently interpreted Exemption 7(C) (as
opposed to other exemptions) in favor of the government. 46 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has construed Exemption 7(C) broadly. 47 The legislative
42. Furthermore, if a court intends to exempt categorically certain information, that court

should, as the Court did in Reporters Committee, demonstrate that in all instances the public interest
would be invalid. Not only does Landano fail to demonstrate this, but the court fails to mention
whether there was, or could be, a specific public interest in obtaining the names of informants or
undercover agents.
43. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text (discussing New York Times Co. v. NASA,
920 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc)).
44. See infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text and note 193 (discussing Dow Jones & Co. v.
Department of Justice, 917 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
45. See infra note 54 and notes 63-64 and accompanying text (applying standard under Exemption 6); see also infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (Judge Revercomb suggesting that the
heightened public interest standard should be applied under Exemption 2).
46. See, eg., Senate of Puerto Rico v. Department of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 587 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (unlike other FOIA exemptions, "Exemption 7(C)'s balance is not similarly 'tilted in favor of
disclosure.'" (quoting Bast v. Department of Justice, 665 F.2d 1251, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1981))).
47. See Harvey v. Department of Justice, 747 F. Supp. 29, 40 (D.D.C. 1990) ("The Supreme
Court takes a liberal view of what constitutes an 'unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' within
the meaning of Exemption 7(C).").
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history of Exemption 7(C) provides additional support for this
interpretation.
After Congress amended the FOIA in 1974,48 Exemption 7(C) was
triggered when disclosure of law enforcement records "would... constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."'4 9 Congress explicitly
omitted the adverb "clearly" that modifies the phrase "unwarranted invasion of privacy" in Exemption 6.50 In 1986, Exemption 7(C) was again
amended, with Congress substituting "could reasonably be expected to"
for "would" as the standard for reviewing the risk of harm from disclosure. 5 1 The 1974 and 1986 amendments to Exemption 7(C)'s language
imply a congressional intent that Exemption 7(C) should be broadly read
to safeguard against potential invasions of personal privacy inherent in
the disclosure of law enforcement records. 52
In sum, Exemption 7(C) should be broadly read. Consequently,
when the Court announced in Reporters Committee that requesters who
attempt to defeat an agency's Exemption 7(C) claim must have an interest in "what the government is up to," it is arguable that the Court expected such a public interest requirement to be limited to Exemption
7(C) challenges, because disclosure of information contained in law enforcement records can be particularly damaging.
a. Requiring a requester to have an interest in government operations when challengingagency withholding under Exemption 6. Requiring a FOIA plaintiff who requests law enforcement records to
demonstrate that the requested information will shed light on govern48. The FOIA, enacted in 1966, has been amended several times since its inception (1967, 1974,
1976, 1978, 1984, and 1986). Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54; Act of Nov.
21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561-64; Act of Sept. 13, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-409,
§ 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247; Act of Oct. 13, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 906(a)(10), 92 Stat. 1225; Act of
Nov. 8, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 402(2), 98 Stat. 3357; Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570,
§§ 1802, 1803, 100 Stat. 3207-48, 3207-49.
49. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, 1563. Before the 1974 amendment, Exemption 7 excluded "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to
the extent available by law to a party other than an agency." Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23,
81 Stat. 54, 55.
50. See Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756
n.8 (1989) (citing 120 CONG. REc. 33158-59 and 34162-63 (1974)) (noting that the word "clearly"
was omitted in response to the President's concerns).
51. Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-48.
52. Relatedly, a broad construction of Exemption 7(C) is supported by a comparison to the
language of Exemption 6-also a personal privacy exemption-which protects personnel, medical,
and "similar files." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988). Exemption 7(C) explicitly imports a less stringent
standard for the government to satisfy in order to deny a FOIA request. Under Exemption 6, agencies must prove that the requested information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
privacy, whereas Exemption 7(C) requires merely a showing that disclosure could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.

Vol. 1991:753]

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

ment operations is consistent with the liberal view of Exemption 7(C),
and is evidently endorsed by Congress. 53 However, it is questionable
whether plaintiffs need to demonstrate that requested information will
shed light on the operations of the government when the government
withholds information under other FOIA exemptions. The D.C. Circuit
answered that question in the affirmative in 1989; 54 in 1990 the Court of
55
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Ray v. Department of Justice,
agreed, applying Reporters Committee's heightened public- interest requirement under Exemption 6. That conclusion, however, does not necessarily follow from Reporters Committee. Moreover, that result makes
it more difficult for citizens to gain access to records the government
deems to be "personnel and medical files and similar files," 5 6 the types of
records exempted by Exemption 6.
In Ray, Haitians who sought political asylum requested information
from government agencies regarding Haitian nationals who had been returned to Haiti.57 Specifically, plaintiffs requested information concerning how the Haitian government treated its citizens who were returned to
Haiti after unsuccessfully attempting to flee to the United States.58 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding that the requested information, which consisted of names, addresses, and other identifying
information, was not covered by Exemption 6, and therefore must be
disclosed. 59 In reaching that conclusion, however, the court implicated
the Reporters Committee public interest requirement under Exemption 6.
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Ray began by applying the traditional Exemption 6 balancing test, "'weighing an individual's right to
protection of privacy against the public's right to disclosure of govern53. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.

54. See National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
In Homer, an Exemption 6 case, the court stated that "unless the public would learn something
directly about the workings of the Government ...disclosure is not affected with the public interest."
Id. at 879. The court rejected two asserted public interests in receiving the names and addresses of
federal annuitants. First, the court rejected the assertion that there was a public interest in the
petitioner receiving the information for lobbying purposes. Second, the court found no public interest in informing the public how its money was being spent. Id; see also Federal Labor Relations
Auth. v. Department of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1451-52 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying Reporters

Committee's heightened public interest standard under Exemption 6).
55. 908 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1990).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988).
57. Ray, 908 F.2d at 1552.
58. Id. The plaintiffs sought evidence to support their contention that the Haitian government
would persecute them if they were returned to Haiti and that, consequently, they deserved political
asylum. Id.
59. Id. at 1553.
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ment information.' "60. The court first noted that significant privacy interests were at stake because the U.S. government had promised the
returned Haitians confidentiality, and because the plaintiffs intended to
contact the returned Haitian individuals whose names were being withheld. 61 After reviewing the public interest in the request, however, the
court held that the public interest in obtaining the information out62
weighed the privacy interest and ordered disclosure.
Ray looked to Reporters Committee to guide its finding that the asserted public interest was sufficient, stating: "We recognize that the
Supreme Court has made clear that the FOIA's basic purpose is to provide the public with a means of learning what its government is up to; the
Act is not designed to assist citizens in gaining information about other
individuals for private purposes. ' 63 Thus, the court agreed with the government that to the extent that the plaintiffs' FOIA request was motivated by self-interest (i.e., not being deported), such an objective was not
the sort of goal the FOIA was enacted to serve. 64 The court did, however, find a valid public interest: ascertaining whether the U.S. government was "monitoring Haiti's compliance with its obligation not to
persecute returnees and to learn whether [the U.S.] government [was]
honest to the public about Haiti's treatment of returnees." 65
Although the Eleventh Circuit found a valid public interest, it is
questionable whether courts should apply the Reporters Committee public interest requirement under Exemption 6. As noted in Ray, Reporters
Committee did not address the application of Exemption 6.66 Exemption
6, by its terms, provides a higher burden for the government to satisfy in
order to withhold requested information: Exemption 6 requires a demonstration that disclosure "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"; whereas Exemption 7(C) permits government
withholding of information that "could reasonably be expected to consti60. Id. at 1554 (quoting Cochran v. United States, 770 F.2d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1985)). Ex-

emption 6, like Exemption 7, ordinarily involves balancing the public interest in disclosure against
the degree of the invasion of privacy that would result from disclosure. See Lesar v. Department of
Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 486 n.80 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
61. Ray, 908 F.2d at 1554.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1555.
65. Id. See infra note 91 and accompanying text (evaluating the asserted public interest in
Ray).

66. Ray, 908 F.2d at 1555 n.2. See also Painting Indus. Mkt. Recovery Fund v. Department of
the Air Force, 751 F. Supp. 1410, 1416 n.3 (D. Haw. 1990) ("Although Reporters Committee is a
landmark case in the area of analysis of FOIA exemptions implicating privacy rights, the decision
dealt with the 7(C) Exemption and not Exemption 6. Accordingly, Reporters Committee is cautiously applied to an analysis of Exemption 6 ....).

Vol. 1991:753]

FREEDOM OFINFORMATION ACT

tute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."' 67 Despite the objections of several agency representatives who wanted Congress to remove
the restrictive language, 68 Congress maintained the current version of
Exemption 6. The Supreme Court itself acknowledged in Reporters
Committee that "the standard for evaluating a threatened invasion of privacy interests [under Exemption 7(C)] is somewhat broader than the
standard applicable to [Exemption 6]."69

In light of the legislative history and the obvious differences between
the language chosen by Congress for each exemption, 70 it is arguable that

application of the Reporters Committee public interest requirement
should be limited only to those plaintiffs who challenge the government's

withholding under Exemption 7(C). It is one thing to contend that the
Court set a requirement (that requested information must shed light on
government operations), the absence of which constitutes an unwarranted invasion of privacy triggering non-disclosure; however, it is quite
another proposition to suggest that this absence satisfies Exemption 6's

requirement of a "clearly" unwarranted invasion of privacy to prevent
disclosure. 71 The argument follows, then, that congressional, not judi72
cial, action should broaden the scope of a narrow FOIA exemption.
One can find support, however, for stretching the Reporters Committee public interest requirement to Exemption 6. When discussing the
67. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (7)(C) (1988) (emphases added). Exemption 6 protects from public
disclosure and dissemination "personnel and medical files and similar files," whereas Exemption
7(C) protects "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes." Id. Although both
Exemption 6 and 7(C) utilize a balancing approach, law enforcement records arguably have the
potential to be more damaging than medical or personnel files. See Bast v. FBI, 665 F.2d 1251, 1254
(D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Branch v. FBI, 658 F. Supp. 204, 209 (D.D.C. 1989) ("It is generally
recognized that the mention of an individual's name in a law enforcement file will engender comment and speculation and carries a stigmatizing connotation.").
68. See Developments--1989,supra note 7, at 1128 n.102 (citing Hearingson H.R. 5012 before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1965) (testimony of Fred B. Smith, acting General Counsel, Treasury Department); id. at 257 (testimony of
William Feldesman, NLRB solicitor)).
69. Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756
(1989). See generally id. at 756 & n.9 (discussing legislative histories and differences between language of Exemptions 6 and 7(C)).
70. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
71. If Reporters Committee had been decided under Exemption 6, then stretching the Court's
standard to Exemption 7(C) would seem less offensive in that, if the absence of the standard would
make an invasion of privacy "clearly" unwarranted, it would necessarily be implicated as making an
invasion of privacy merely unwarranted.
72. See Developments-1989, supra note 7, at 1128-29:
In the future, Congress may decide that an added exemption may be necessary to prevent
exploitation of the FOIA as a source of business information for private commercial interest. Until that occurs, however, it is not within a court's province to expand exemptions in
order to narrow the statute and thereby subvert the public's congressionally created right
to information.
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public interest requirement under 7(C), Reporters Committee drew support from Departmentof the Air Force v. Rose, 73 an earlier Exemption 6
case. 74 Rose noted that "the basic purpose of the [FOIA is] 'to open
agency action to the light of public scrutiny.' "-Reporters Committee,
commenting on Rose, explained that "[i]f, instead of seeking information
about the [Air Force] Academy's own conduct, the requests had asked
for specific files to obtain information about the persons to whom those
files related, the public interest that supported the decision in Rose would
have been inapplicable. ' 76 Thus, it is arguable that Reporters Committee, through a retrospective analysis of Rose, implicitly sanctioned the
application of the stricter public interest requirement under Exemption
6.
Moreover, the strict public interest requirement can be applied to
Exemption 6 without destroying the distinction between the standards
incorporated under Exemptions 6 and 7(C). If a request would not shed
light on government operations, then it would not qualify for balancing
under either exemption and the requested information could be withheld.
If the information would shed light on government operations, then that
information would have a valid public interest. However, the weight of
that particular public interest would still have to be balanced against the
invasion of privacy. It is in the balancing process that the different standards employed under Exemptions 6 and 7(C) arise, a more substantial
public interest being required under Exemption 7(C). 77
Finally, although broadly construing Exemption 6 and equating it
with Exemption 7(C) may contradict a formalistic interpretation of the
FOLA language, that application is not unsound. The purpose of the
FOIA should be to provide citizens with the right to be informed about
"what their government is up to," not to require the government to be a
central depository of information about private citizens, accessible at the
request of any person for any reason. The latter notion would place an
undue burden on the government, and would render all personal infor' 78
mation "fair game."
73. 425 U.S. 352 (1976) (involving a request for the case summaries of Air Force Academy
honor and ethics hearings).
74. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 773-74.
75. Rose, 425 U.S. at 372.
76. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 774.
77. See Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. Department of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1451-52

(D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Although the context in Reporters Committee was ...exemption 7(C), we see no
reason why the characterof the disclosure interest should be different under exemption 6.... [The]
difference between (the standards of exemption 6] and exemption 7(C) goes only to the weight of the
privacy interest needed to outweigh disclosure.").
78. It is important to emphasize that Exemption 7(C) has the effect of protecting individual
citizens from invasions of privacy resulting from the probable humiliation, embarrassment, and
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b. Requiring a requester to demonstrate that requested information
would shed light on government operationswhen challengingagency withholding underExemption 2. Although it may be possible to endorse the
application of the Reporters Committee public interest standard under
Exemption 6 because of the similarities between Exemptions 6 and 7(C),
the Reporters Committee requirement that requests must shed light on
the operation of the government seems less justifiable under other FOIA
exemptions. Nevertheless, not everyone rejects the possibility of requiring the use of that standard outside of Exemptions 6 and 7(C). This is
evidenced by a dissent filed by U.S. District Judge Revercomb, sitting by
designation with the D.C. Circuit, in Schwaner v. Departmentof the Air
Force,7 9 an Exempti6n 2 case.
Exemption 2 of the FOIA provides that the statute's mandatory disclosure requirements do not apply to "matters that are.., related solely
to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency . . . . 0 In
Schwaner, an insurance agent requested a list of names and addresses of
certain military personnel as a source of potential customers.8 1 Setting
out the scope of Exemption 2, the court stated:
Our cases have sought to give exemption 2 some structure by adopting
a two-step process. "First, the material withheld should fall within the
terms of the statutory language." If so, the agency may defeat disclosure by proving that either "disclosure may risk circumvention of
agency regulation," or "the material relates to trivial administrative
matters of no genuine public interest." 82
Having ordered disclosure because the information did not satisfy the
first part of the two-step analysis, the court did not reach the second step,
"which... would entail the weighing of the 'public interest' in disclosure
against the government's interest in avoiding the burden of producing the
83
data."
Judge Revercomb dissented, expressing his belief that the requested
material was of no "genuine public interest."8s4 Judge Revercomb anastigma associated with a criminal investigation. As such, it represents a compromise, justifying the
government's decision to withhold information from one group of citizens in the interest of another.
79. 898 F.2d 793, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Revercomb, J., dissenting).
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)(1988).
81. Schwaner, 898 F.2d at 794.
82. Id (citations omitted). See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 369-70
(1975) ("The general thrust of [Exemption 2] is simply to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and maintaining for public inspection matter in which the public could not reasonably be
expected to have an interest.").
83. Schwaner, 898 F.2d at 798.
84. Id. at 801 (Revercomb, J., dissenting). The requirement of a "genuine public interest"
stems from Rose, 425 U.S. at 369 ("Exemption 2 is not applicable to matters subject to such a
genuine and significant public interest.").
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lyzed the scope of the public interest by referring to Reporters
Committee:
Whether information sought under FOIA is a matter of genuine public
interest will depend on whether the request serves FOIA's core purposes, Le., "to ensure that the Government's activities be opened to the
sharp eye of public scrutiny." In essence, the question is whether the
information sought would improve the public's understanding of the
way in which government operates.8 5
Consequently, because he found that the personnel list was unrelated to
86
the FOIA's purpose, he concluded that the list could be withheld.
It is questionable whether such a strict public interest standard
should be utilized under Exemption 2. Indeed, case law suggests that
courts should be lenient when dealing with public interest under Exemp-

tion 2. For example, in FoundingChurch of Scientology, Inc. v. Smith, 87
the D.C. Circuit noted in a footnote that "given the presumption favoring disclosure expressed in FOIA, a reasonably low threshold should be
maintained for determining when withheld administrative material relates to significant public interests."8 8
The Reporters Committee public interest standard, however, entails
more than a mere "reasonably low threshold," and therefore, it should
not be utilized under Exemption 2. Exemption 2, unlike Exemption
7(C), does not need a high threshold because the public interest is not
balanced against an invasion of personal privacy-a serious concern warranting extra protection. Rather, the public interest is balanced against
an administrative concern. Regardless, because Exemption 2 potentially

85. Schwaner, 898 F.2d at 800 (citation omitted).
86. Id. at 801.
87. 721 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
88. Id. at 830 n.4 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Subsequently, in Army Times Publishing Co. v. Department of the Army, 684 F. Supp. 720 (D.D.C. 1988), the district court concluded
that a newspaper publisher's request for records containing names and addresses of Army personnel
satisfied the low threshold, stating:
[G]iven the high regard in which the Army Times [newspaper] appears to be held by members of the service, military officers, and the public generally, and the importance of open
communication on military issues affecting this country,... the broad circulation of the
Army Times is inthe public interest.
Id. at 724. Similarly, in Retired Officers Ass'n v. Dept. of Navy, 716 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1989),
orderedvacated in parton reconsideration,744 F. Supp. (D.D.C. 1990), the court, citing to Founding
Church, found a valid public interest in that:
Plaintiff, a non-profit organization formed to promote the interests of retiring and retired
officers of the military, intends to use the requested names and addresses solely for the
purpose of notifying retired and retiring officers... of its existence. Plaintiff promotes the
interests of its members.., by lobbying .... keeping members informed of government
activities affecting them, and assisting members in obtaining benefits to which they are
entitled.
Id. at 665. Neither Army Times nor Retired Officers involve a public interest that would pass under
Reporters Committee's stringent public interest standard, because they do not shed light on government operations.
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involves a public interest inquiry, and because the court in Reporters
Committee discussed at length what constitutes a valid public interest,
courts may attempt, as Judge Revercomb advocated, to raise the public
interest threshold in future Exemption 2 determinations.
In conclusion, Reporters Committee has had an impact on the public
interest standard necessary to trigger disclosure of information under
certain FOIA exemptions. As a result, courts are more likely to require
requesters who challenge agency nondisclosure to demonstrate that the
requested information will shed light on government operations.
Although most relevant 1990 decisions have found alleged public interests insufficient,8 9 cases such as Ray demonstrate that the public interest
requirement, although difficult to satisfy, is not an impossible burden.
Several courts have since found interests sufficiently "public" to warrant
disclosure. 90 Yet Ray may demonstrate another point: Courts may ac89. For example, in KTVY-TV v. United States, 919 F.2d 1465 (10th Cir. 1990), a television
station sought disclosure of the identities and statements of the interviewees of an internal postal
service investigation, instigated after a postal employee shot and killed 14 postal workers. Id. at
1467-68. The court found no public interest in knowing "whether the shootings could have been
avoided." Id. at 1470. In Simon v. Department of Justice, 752 F. Supp. 14, 15 (D.t.C. 1990),
plaintiff sought a record about himself created by the FBI in connection with a 1951 investigation
into violations of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-798 (1988). Plaintiff alleged
that the public had an interest in knowing that the FBI investigated innocent people for communist
affiliations. Id. at 17. The court found the asserted public interest lacking, expressing that, although
the plaintiff may have had a "pressing interest," id. at 19 n.5, in knowing the "identity of FBI agents,
government employees, and others" related to the requested information, disclosure would not provide information "about what their government is up to.'" Id. at 19 (quoting Department of Justice
v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)). In Stone v. FBI, 727 F.
Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, No. 90-5065 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1990) (unreported) (1990 WL
134431), scholars studying the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy sought disclosure of the
names of lower-level FBI and law enforcement personnel involved in the assassination investigation.
Id. at 663. Plaintiffs alleged a public interest in a more accurate history of the Kennedy assassination. Id. at 666. The court rejected this asserted interest, because "releasing the names of lowerlevel agents would not inform citizens about what their government was up to nor would it reveal
how the FBI conducted the investigation." Id at 667. In Fitzgibbon v. Secret Serv., 747 F. Supp. 51
(D.D.C. 1990), a historian who researched alleged plots by the regime of a former head of state of
the Dominican Republic to assassinate President Kennedy or kidnap his daughter, id. at 54, sought
FBI and Secret Service records, alleging a public interest in that the records "may shed light on a
plot by agents of the ... regime." Id. at 59. The court rejected this contention, expressing that it
was "not a public interest within 'the basic purpose of [the FOIA] to open agency action to the light
of public scrutiny.'" Id. (quoting Reporters Committee 489 U.S. at 774).
90. For example, in Dunkelberger v. Department of Justice, 906 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1990), a
reporter sought employment records of an FBI agent to learn about the agent's alleged suspension
for misconduct during an investigation. Id at 779. The plaintiff asserted a public interest in "the
public's right to be informed 'about intentional over-stepping by an FBI agent in his dealings with a
political figure and the drug scene.'" Id. at 782 (quoting Appellant's Brief at 1). The court, after an
in camera review of the withheld information, found nothing in the record to support the plaintiff's
suspicion, but implied that if relevant information were included, the public interest would be sufficient to trigger disclosure. Id. In Bretti v. Department of Justice, No. 88-CV-328 (N.D.N.Y. June
18, 1990) (1990 WL 84366) (1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7514), the plaintiff sought disclosure of tapes
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cept a plaintiff's opportunistically-phrased public interest claim that arguably would not have been accepted in Reporters Committee. Thus,

courts may not actually be restrained by Reporters Committee; they may
still disclose at their discretion if they are able to find an indirect public

interest in a request, no matter how far-fetched it may seem. 91

B. Broadening the Threshold of Exemption 6 While Distinguishing
Between Lexical and Non-Lexical Information: New York
Times Co. v. NASA.
In perhaps the most significant decision rendered under the FOIA in
1990, an en banc majority of the D.C. Circuit held in New York Times

Co. v. NASA

92

that the audio portion of a tape recording (as opposed to

the written transcript of that tape) is potentially exempt from disclosure
under Exemption 6. Specifically, the majority held that the audio por-

tion of a tape recording that contained human voices is a "similar file"
(thereby meeting the threshold requirement of Exemption 6), because

human voice inflections constitute the type of personal information that
may warrant special protection. 93 The decision has the potential to curtail future access under the FOIA via Exemption 6.
Exemption 6 permits agencies to withhold "personnel and medical
files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."' 94 Judicial review of agency
withholding under Exemption 6 involves a two-part analysis: First, as a

threshold matter, the requested information must be contained in personand transcripts that were used against him in his criminal trial. Id.at 1 (LEXIS pagination). Plaintiff asserted a public interest in that the disclosure would "prove that exculpatory statements were
redacted from... transcripts admitted at trial." Id. at 5. The court found a valid public interest in
the public benefitting from the potential of exposing that criminal enforcement agencies followed
improper procedures. See id. at 6. In Painting Indus. Mkt. Recovery Fund v. Department of the
Air Force, 751 F. Supp. 1410 (D. Haw.), reh'g denied, 756 F. Supp. 452 (D. Haw. 1990), plaintiff
sought disclosure of certified payroll records of a painting contractor on a military housing contract
that contained employee names, addresses, phone numbers, and social security numbers. Id. at
1411-12. The plaintiff alleged a public interest in assuring that the Air Force complied with its
enforcement duties under the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1988). The court agreed, and
ordered disclosure of the names, addresses, and phone numbers. Id at 1417.
91. For example, in Ray, the plaintiffs had an interest in not being deported. To be sure, they
sought information about the Haitiangovernment activities, namely, how they treated returned Haitian nationals. Yet the court was willing to find an indirect public interest in assuring that the U.S.
government was adequately monitoring the Haitian government. It appears that almost any request
can be characterized as having an interest in monitoring the U.S. government. For example, the
disclosure of rap sheets could very well indicate whether the government was accurately maintaining
criminal history information.
92. 920 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
93. See id. at 1004.
94. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6) (1988). See supra notes 52, 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing
Exemption 6 and comparing and contrasting it with Exemption 7(C)).
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nel, medical, or "similar" files; second, if within such a file, disclosure of
the information must constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 95 The latter requirement results in a balancing process
similar to that utilized under Exemption 7(C).96 The former requirement, specifically the scope of "similar files," was at issue in New York
Times.
The leading interpretation of the scope and meaning of the phrase
"similar ifies" under Exemption 6 is the Supreme Court's landmark decision, Departmentof State v. Washington Post Co. 97 In Washington Post,
the Court rejected the D.C. Circuit's holding that "similar fies" referred
only to those files containing information "of the same magnitude-as
highly personal or as intimate in nature-as that at stake in personnel
and medical records." 9 8 After analyzing the legislative history of Exemption 6, the Court concluded that it did "not think that Congress
meant to limit Exemption 6 to a narrow class of fies containing only a
discrete kind of personal information. Rather, '[t]he exemption [was] intended to cover detailed Government records on an individual which can
be identified as applying to that individual.' "99 Thus, although the
threshold requirement appears to focus on the type of agency ifie involved, the threshold is satisfied as long as the requested information,
however stored, applies to a particularindividual. The fact situation
presented in New York Times, however, proved to be a difficult application of Washington Post.
New York Times involved a FOIA request by the New York Times
Company (the "Times") to NASA for the audio tape recording of the
voice communications between crew members of the space shuttle Challenger, and between the crew and ground control, immediately before the
Challenger exploded. 100 NASA provided the Times with a written transcript of the communications, but refused to release the actual audio
tape.10 1 Consequently, the Times ified suit.
95. See Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 598 (1982).
96. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
97. 456 U.S. 595 (1982).
98. Id at 598 (quoting Washington Post Co. v. Department of State, 647 F.2d 197, 198-99
(D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd, 456 U.S. 595 (1982)).
99. Id. at 602 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11 (1966), reprintedin 1966
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2418, 2428).

100. New York Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc). The space
shuttle Challenger, carrying seven crew members, exploded 73 seconds after lift-off on January 28,
1986. The Times allegedly sought the tape to ascertain whether the astronauts sensed any problems

in the operation of the shuttle that may have caused the explosion.
101. Id. In denying the request, NASA explained that "the privacy of the families of the astro-

nauts would be invaded significantly by its release because it would subject them to hearing the
voices of their loved ones, an intrusion on their grief which certainly would exacerbate feelings of
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In the district court, NASA invoked Exemption 6, contending, with
respect to the threshold requirement, that the requested tape was a "similar Mfle." 10 2 The court disagreed, stating that "[ilt [was] evident throughout the Supreme Court's opinion in [Washington Post] that the Court
presumed that a record can be considered a 'similar file' only where it
contains personal information about a particular person." 10 3 Because the
court found it "undisputed that the Challenger tape... contain[ed] no
[personal] information about the astronauts or their family members,"
the tape was not a "similar file." 1 4 Accordingly, the court ordered
10 5
NASA to release the tape.
On appeal in the D.C. Circuit, a divided panel affirmed the district
court's decision.10 6 The D.C. Circuit framed the issue as "whether the
sound of the human voice communicating nonpersonal information will
alone raise the tape to the level of a similar file for purposes of Exemption
6."107 NASA argued "that the human voice, being unique to each individual, 'clearly is information about the individual and identifiable as
such.' "108 Specifically, NASA contended that the astronauts' voice inflections constituted the personal information necessary to trigger "similar file" status. 109
The D.C. Circuit noted, however, that although Washington Post
construed "similar fies" broadly, the Supreme Court acknowledged in a
footnote that " 'fiJnformation unrelated to any particularperson presumably would not satisfy the threshold test.' "110 Following the rhetoric of
the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the tape did not
contain personal information and therefore was not a "similar file." 11
This conclusion was influenced by a concern that a contrary holding
would invariably render every audio tape recording of human vocalization a "similar fie," regardless of the tape's content, because "every perhurt and loss." New York Times Co. v. NASA, 679 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, 852 F.2d
602 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd, 920 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane)).
102. New York Times, 679 F. Supp. at 35.
103. Id at 36.
104. Id.
105. Id. The district court did not need to consider the other aspect of an Exemption 6 reviewwhether releasing the tape "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy." 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(6) (1988).
106. New York Times Co. v. NASA, 852 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
107. Id. at 605.
108. Id. at 604 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 15).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 605-06 (quoting Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602 n.4
(1982)).
111. Id. at 606. The court argued that calling "the sound of a human voice 'personal information' distorts the plain meaning and common understanding of the phrase, as well as the meaning
Congress ascribed to it." Id.
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son's voice is essentially unique." ' 12 The court admonished that a focus
on the manner of conveyance would render meaningless the threshold
test of Exemption 6.113

On rehearing en banc, the D.C. Circuit, in a six-to-five decision,
held that the Challenger tape was indeed a "similar file" under Exemp-

tion 6. The case was then remanded to determine whether disclosure
114

would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
The majority, Judge Douglas Ginsburg writing, began by expressing that
"[t]he FOIA makes no distinction between information in lexical and
that in non-lexical form"; 115 both are subject to the FOIA's mandatory
disclosure requirements and exemptions. Noting that "[t]he lexical and
non-lexical aspects of a file may convey different information,"'1 16 the majority implicitly endorsed a bifurcated analysis of agency-withheld
records. Thus, a court must analyze the lexical and non-lexical aspects

of requested information independently to determine the validity of
agency withholding under the FOIA. 117 Having bifurcated its examination of the Challenger crew's communications, the majority focused on
the audio tape, specifically the voice inflections of the crew, to determine
whether that information constituted a "similar file" within the meaning

of Exemption 6.
112. Id. at 607. The court elaborated:
If, for example, a governmental official gave a public speech about the activities of a governmental agency, a tape of the speech automatically would be a similar file despite the fact
that it contains no information personal to the official or anyone else....
Moreover, accreditation of NASA's argument that the uniqueness of the individual
astronauts' voices renders the tape a "similar file" would lead to incongruous results in
analogous contexts. Since handwriting is identifiable as the work of a particular individual,
by NASA's reasoning every handwritten document would also become a similar file.
Id.
113. Judge Douglas Ginsburg filed a lengthy dissent. He found that Washington Post's statement that information applying to a particular individual satisfied the "similar file" threshold was
dispositive of the issue. He believed that the astronauts' voice inflections "applied to" the astronauts,
and therefore were "personal information." See id at 607-12 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The substance of Judge Ginsburg's dissent was later accepted by the majority opinion in an en banc rehearing of New York Times, which reversed the divided panel's disclosure order. See infra notes 114-25,
133-39 and accompanying text.
114. 920 F.2d 1002, 1009-10 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc). The decision was split along political
lines; the so-called "conservative" judges expressed the view that the tape was a "similar file." See
DC CircuitAgain Changes Privacy Equation, AccEss RaP., Dec. 12, 1990, at 2.
115. New York Times, 920 F.2d at 1005. The court implied that "lexical" is tantamount to
"written," and therefore that non-lexical information encompasses all non-written aspects of information. For example, a picture or audio is non-lexical information, but a transcript of the audio is
lexical. See id.
116. Id.

117. The court implicitly drew an analogy between an audio tape together with its written transcript, and a "textual report accompanied by a picture." Id. The court stated that a combined text
and picture provide more information than the text alone, and that "[i]n a particular case, the picture might be exempt from disclosure while the text is not (or vice versa)." Id.

774
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The majority deferred to Washington Post when it examined the
scope of the "similar file" threshold. It stated that "[t]he information
need not be intimate; the threshold for application of Exemption 6 is
crossed if the information merely 'applies to a particular individual' "1 1 8-the threshold is "minimal."1 1 9 Thus, the important question
is not whether an audio tape is similar in form to personnel or medical
files, but rather whether the nature of the information contained within
that "audio file" is intimate and personal, and therefore similar to the
information contained in-personnel and medical records.

The majority recognized that, "while the taped words do not contain information aboutthe personal lives of the astronauts, disclosure of
the file would reveal the sound and inflection of the crew's voices during

the last seconds of their lives."' 20 The majority concluded that because
the astronauts' voice inflections were particular to the individual astronauts, the audio tape qualified as a "similar file" under Exemption 6 of
the FOIA. In reaching this conclusion, the majority rejected the panel's

theory that characterizing voice inflections as personal information
would invariably result in every audio tape recording being deemed a

"similar file" regardless of its content.121 First, the majority accused the
panel of failing "to acknowledge that information is not conveyed by
words alone": The information communicated by the words and voice

inflections were distinguishable. 122 Second, the majority disagreed with

the panel's contention that recognizing non-lexical information as per-

sonal information would render the similar-fies threshold meaning118. Id. at 1006 (quoting Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602
(1982)) (emphasis added).
119. Id. (quoting Washington Post Co. v. HHS, 690 F.2d 252, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). The court
explained that a good reason exists for a minimal threshold:
[I]nformation that fails to cross that threshold must be released without regard to any
invasion of personal privacy that may result, and without regard to whether there is a
sufficient public interest in its release to warrant the harm caused by that invasion of privacy. A threshold that excludes too much would undermine what the Supreme Court
described as the Congress's objective of "provid[ing] a proper balance between the protection of an individual's right of privacy and the preservation of the public's right to Government information."
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2418, 2428, quoted in Washington Post, 456 U.S. at 599). The second step
of Exemption 6 review-the weighing of public and privacy interests to preclude an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy--serves as a filter that blocks information that should not be disclosed.
120. Ie at 1005.

121. New York Times Co. v. NASA, 852 F. 2d 602, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd 920 F.2d 1002
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane).
122. New York Times, 920 F.2d at 1006. The court made an analogy for support, stating:
"Reading the libretto of a Verdi opera is not the same as hearing the opera performed. So, too, the
meaning of Marc Antony's speech over the body of Caesar is not to be found in the disembodied
words on the printed page, but in the voice that contradicts them." Id.
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The threshold would retain meaning, argued the majority,
because "surely millions, perhaps billions" of government files lack nonlexical information. 124 ,Furthermore, even when government files do contain information beyond mere words, not all non-lexical information can
be traced to a particular individual. For example, a fie may contain
125
unidentifiable voices or voices of multiple parties.
The dissent 126 criticized the majority for holding, as they understood it, "that if an identifiable individual is somehow connected with a
Government file, that file automatically becomes a 'similar file' under Exemption 6."127 To be a "similar fie," the dissent argued, "a file must be a
'detailed Government record[ ] on an individual which can be identified
as applying to that individual,' ",128 and "it must contain personal information about the subject of the fle." 129 The dissent argued that the language of Exemption 6, its legislative history, and Washington Post all
make clear that the personal information that triggers "similar file" status "cannot be information about the author or maker of the file unless
les.123

123. Id
124. Id.
125. Id Or, as the court asserted, "the financial records of a large corporation ... still do not
pass the threshold because they do not contain information 'personal to any particular individual.'
Id. at 1007. Indeed, the Supreme Court emphasized in Washington Post that a broad construction of
"similar files" would not destroy the threshold requirement of Exemption 6: "[Trhere are undoubtedly many Government files which contain information not personal to any particular individual
....
Information unrelated to any particular person presumably would not satisfy the threshold
test." Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 603 n.4 (1982).
126. See New York Times, 920 F.2d at 1010 (Edwards, J., dissenting). Then-Chief Judge Wald
and Judges Mikva, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, and Robinson joined Judge Edwards in dissent.
127. Id at 1012.
128. Id. at 1011 (quoting Washington Pos4 456 U.S. at 602). By this requirement, the dissent
implies that information that happens to have personal qualities or is somehow connected with an
individual is not sufficient to satisfy Exemption 6. Rather, the dissent appears to conceptualize the
traditional government record (e.g., a folder that is stored in a file cabinet and contains a list of
someone's past residency or voting record) as the only type of information capable of qualifying as a
"similar file." In the dissent's view, voice inflections, apart from the transcribed words, would not
fall within that category. Indeed, the dissent makes a strong conceptual argument to this effect:
In Washington Post, the Court did not stray from its conclusion... that, in order to be a
"similar file," a file must contain personal information. Rather, adhering to that view, the
Court expanded the scope of the type of "personal information" that qualified for "similar
file" status, rejecting this court's narrower conception according to which the information
had to be "highly personal or intimate in nature."
Id. at 1014 n.3.
129. Id. at 1011. Explaining its conviction that the FOIA protects only the subject of a file from
an invasion of personal privacy, the dissent noted:
Every Government file.., has two analytically distinct attributes. One is that it is made or
authored by some person or group of persons. Another is that it has a subject, which may
or may not be a person.... Of course it is possible for the author and the subject of a given
file to be the same, but they are always analytically distinct for purposes of applying Exemption 6.
Id. at 1014. The dissent recognized that there inevitably will be borderline cases making it difficult
to discern a file's true subject. Id. at 1014 n.4; see infra note 135.
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she or he is also the subject of the file";130 to hold otherwise would render
the "similar files" test meaningless, because every file can be viewed in
such a way as to reveal personal information about the creator. 131 Because the dissent believed that the astronauts were the authors of the
audio "fle"-a data-gathering tape-and not the file's subjects, it con1 32
cluded that the tape did not qualify for Exemption 6 protection.

The majority attacked the dissent's author/subject distinction.
First, the majority noted Washington Post's instruction that if requested
information "applies to a particular individual" then it constitutes a

"similar ffle."

133 Because

an author may be a "particular individual," ar-

gued the majority, that person may indeed have a protectable privacy
interest under Exemption 6. Second, the majority emphatically de-

nounced the dissent's supposition that courts are capable of determining

34
a file's true subject, stressing that not every file has a clear subject.'
Under the dissent's approach, argued the majority, every FOIA plaintiff
would invariably characterize the file subject in such a way as to influ1 35
ence the determination of disclosability.

For example, the majority noted that whether the astronauts are the
subject of the requested tape depends on the information that one seeks
from the tape.136 One could characterize the subject of the tape as "the
operation of the shuttle," as the dissent maintains;1 37 however, the sub-

ject also could be characterized as "an air disaster, last words, astro130. New York Times, 920 F.2d at 1015 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
131. Id. "For example, a typewritten report or letter reveals a good deal of personal information
about its author, including information about the depth and breadth of his or her education (as
reflected in such elements as word choice, syntactic felicity, mastery of subject matter), editorial
care, ... and so on." Id.
132. Id. at 1018. The dissent characterized, as had the panel majority, the subject of the tapes as
information that concerned the operation of the shuttle immediately prior to its explosion. See id. at
1017.
133. Id. at 1007 (quoting Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602
(1982)).
134. Id.
135. Id. The dissent disagreed with this assertion. It recognized that there would be "borderline
cases," but suggested that:
[I]n any such case, a court is capable of making a context-specific inquiry to determine
what or who is the subject of a file, taking into account such factors as the purpose for
which an agency created and maintains the file and the understanding of the person who is
possibly its subject.
In all cases the court's assessment would turn upon the information actually contained
within the file .... Contrary to the majority's suggestion, posturing by the parties, such as
how "opportunistically" they characterize the subject of a file, or what sort of information
they hope might be extracted from it, would obviously be quite beside the point of the
court's central inquiry: whether the file actually contains personal information about a
particular individual.
Id. at 1014 n.4 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1007.
137. Id. at 1011.
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nauts, [or] voices of famous people." 13 8 Regardless, the author/subject
distinction was unworkable; it led to an inquiry, contrary to the holding
of Washington Post, into the nature of the file, as opposed to simply
139
whether the information "applies to a particular individual."
The majority and the dissent disagreed on several points, but at the
foundation of both opinions lies a fundamental point of divergence: the
interpretation of Washington Post. Although both groups allege support
for their positions from Washington Post, it appears that the holding in
that case was overly broad and unworkably vague in relation to the facts
of New York Times. The en banc majority in New York Times reads
Washington Post liberally. For the most part the majority finds support
from the Court's broad statement that information "applying to a particular individual" satisfies the "similar files" threshold. In the majority's
view, the voice inflections applied to the particular astronauts on board
the Challenger, and therefore the tape constituted a "similar file." The
dissent, however, reads Washington Post as requiring more than a mere
connection between a fie and an identifiable individual: The file must
contain personal information about a particular individual. The dissent
apparently envisions the traditional agency ifie (such as a medical or personnel file) in which personal information, perhaps biographical statistics, is maintained. Consequently, the dissent views the tape as
containing merely statements regarding shuttle operations, and not personal information.

In light of its vagueness, the Washington Post decision provides little
assistance for the resolution of the issues presented in New York Times.
The application of Washington Post's "similar fie" standard in general,

and in New York Times specifically, ultimately leads to the following
question: What is "personal information" (such that privacy concerns
may be justified)? This query necessarily involves a semantic inquiry into
138. Id.at 1008.
139. Id. at 1009. In addition to a general rejection of the author/subject distinction, the court
attacked the dissent's proposed "context-specific" inquiry to deal with those borderline files in which
the file's subject is difficult to discern. The court admonished that a context-specific inquiry "fails to
recognize that the relevant context is a function of the purpose of the inquiry." Id. at 1008. In
searching for a file's subject, "one could stop arbitrarily at any point and announce a result, as one
likes." Id. For example:
[S]uppose ...that someone doing research for a biography of [one of the astronauts] seeks
disclosure . . . of "all cockpit and other voice recordings of [that astronaut]." By the
dissenters' approach ..... [d]isclosure would thus depend upon whether the tapes are
scattered among files relating to different missions, as opposed to being collected in [a]
single file ....

An inquiry into the reason a file was created, or the manner in which it is maintained,
does not appear to be any different from an inquiry into the label on the file, which the
Supreme Court emphatically rejected in Washington Post.

Id. at 1008-09.
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the connotations of "personal" and "information." In the abstract, these
questions are understandably difficult to answer. In relation to a specific
factual situation, as evidenced by New York Times, the answer proves to
be no easier to ascertain.
At the district and appellate levels, the courts hearing New York
Times confronted the meaning of "personal information" both explicitly
and implicitly. The district court reasoned that a government record
must contain personal information to be considered a "similar file," and
summarily concluded that the tape lacked personal information.14° The
panel majority also emphasized that a file is not "similar" unless it contains personal information, which it implicitly defined as "information
somehow related to an individual's life." 14 1 In his dissenting opinion,
Judge Ginsburg criticized the panel majority for its narrow conception of
"personal information." 142 He argued that the voice inflections were personal information, because they "applied," under the rhetoric of Washington Post, to the individual astronauts. 143 On rehearing en banc, the
debate continued. Here Judge Douglas Ginsburg, writing for the majority, endorsed a broad interpretation of what constitutes personal information, contending that non-lexical information was one type of
information that can "apply" to an individual. 144 The dissent disagreed,
finding that the tape lacked information about the personal lives of
the astronauts; the dissent found, the tape was not "personal
information."

145

Whether voice inflections constitute "personal information" is not a
black-and-white issue; rather, it is a subjective determination unanswerable by precedent or legislative history. For the en banc majority, the
140. New York Times Co. v. NASA, 679 F. Supp. 33, 36 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, 852 F.2d 602
(D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd, 920 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
141. New York Times Co. v. NASA, 852 F.2d 602, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd, 920 F.2d 1002
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
142. Id at 609 (D. Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Judge Douglas Ginsburg stated:
Whatever else [the majority's] use of "personal" means, it is apparently something more
than the Supreme Court's test that the information merely "applies to a particular individual"; for the information that the Times has requested in this case clearly satisfies that
test .... In dictionary terms, the phrase "about an individual" and the word "personal" are
virtually synonymous. The court, however, means by "personal" something more than
"about an individual" since it actually uses both phrases in the same breath. The inflection
of a voice, moreover, if it conveys anything at all, conveys something "about an individual."... What more is required for information to be "personal," then?... [T]he only
indication.., is the court's suggestion that "personal" information is that which is somehow related to an individual's life.
Id (citations omitted).
143. Id at 609-10. Judge Ginsburg stated: "What, then, does the court consider to be 'personal'
information? Where is the distinction between the ... voice and the personal citizenship, date of
birth, and place of birth [regarded as highly personal by Washington Post]?" Id. at 610.
144. New York Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
145. Id at 1011 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
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question was determinative of the "similar files" claim. The en banc dissent, however, created a further requirement: Personal information must
concern the subject of the fle. 146 The distinction between the author and
subject of a ifie, however, further complicates the issue of whether files
that contain voice inflections or other non-lexical information qualify as

"similar files" by adding additional subjective factors to the determina-

tion. As Judge Ginsburg properly recognized, it is absurd to suggest that
a given file has only one ascertainable subject; the subject of a file varies
according to how one perceives that file.' 47 Under such an approach, not
only would courts commence self-fulfilling and arbitrary searches for the
subject of a file, but FOIA plaintiffs and the government would opportunistically phrase the subject in ways intended to fit their particular
needs. Such a result would only add to the confusion of determining
whether or not certain records constitute "similar files." Accordingly,

the court is correct to reject the author/subject approach offered by the
dissent. 148
146. Id.
147. 1& at 1008. Judge Ginsburg stated:
[lI]t is mechanistic in the extreme to insist that [the operation of the shuttle] is... the only
fair statement of the subject of the tape ....

Yet insist the dissent does--as though the

world were neatly divided and labeled according to the rules of English usage.

Id

Suppose that "the purpose for which an agency created and maintains" a file is the
study of voice inflections, or research into computerized voice recognition. In a file of
audio tapes classified by type of voice inflection, [the Challenger tape] might be under the
heading "mortal fear." In a file created in the course of voice recognition research, it might
be found under the name of the person whose voice it is. Obviously, there is no unique
subject inherent in the text of the file. One could equally well say of the Challenger tapedepending upon the filing system in which the agency "maintains" it-that thersubject is an
air disaster, last words, astronauts, voices of famous people, or, as the dissent classifies it,
"the operation of the shuttle."

148. As the dissent noted, they knew "of no case ... in which a 'similar file' under Exemption 6
has been construed to cover personal information pertaining to the author or maker of the file." Id.
at 1016 (Edwards, J., dissenting). However, this may be true simply because no court bothered
making such a ridiculous distinction. The weakness of the dissent's approach is demonstrated by
their characterization of the 1967 Apollo I spacecraft incident, in which a fire in the cockpit killed
three astronauts. The majority referred to NASA's audio tape of the incident as support for the
proposition that the voices on the tape conveyed "additional information that applie[d] to the astronauts in the throes of their deaths." Id. at 1006. The dissent responded with the following weak
attempt to distinguish the Apollo I incident from the Challenger explosion:
It is telling that the majority, in order to make the point that voice inflections can convey
personal information, must resort to a case not before us, the 1967 fire aboard the Apollo I
spacecraft, in which voice inflections certainly revealed genuinely, even profoundly, personal information. That, of course, is a very different case, one in which the tragic course
of events-a fire occurring over several minutes-transformed the astronauts into the
tape's subjects as well as its authors. Here, however,. . . the very suddenness of the tragedy
precluded the Challenger tape from assuming that character.,
Id. at 1018 (Edwards, J., dissenting). The majority, straining to discern the dissent's distinction
between the Apollo I and Challenger tapes, concluded that "[n]o explanation is, or could be, provided because the approach taken by the dissent offers no criterion of judgment." Id. at 1008.
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In the final analysis, the majority's holding seems appropriate in
light of the vague standard ("applying to an individual") set forth in
Washington Post, the difficulty in applying this standard to voice inflections, and the inherent problems with the author/subject distinction.
However, the court's decision, although significant, only determined the
threshold requirement of Exemption 6 (that it constituted a "similar"
file); the court did not decide whether the tape, or any non-lexical information for that matter, was actually exempt from disclosure under the
FOIA. Indeed, as New York Times noted, both Congress and the
Supreme Court acknowledge that a broad construction of Exemption 6's
threshold test is acceptable, because the operation of Exemption 6 will
theoretically be checked at the balancing stage, determining whether a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy would occur.149
Yet although the Exemption 6 balancing test may operate as a check
on a broad threshold test, a significant externality dilutes that rationaleReportersCommittee's stringent public interest standard.1 50 Thus, information that satisfies a broad Exemption 6 threshold test will not be
checked by balancing if that information does not shed light on government operations. Therefore, the D.C. Circuit's broad construction of the
threshold test, combined with its narrow view of what constitutes a valid
public interest, may significantly increase agency withholding of
information.
Although a narrow public interest standard would seemingly dilute
the argument that a broad construction of the Exemption 6 threshold is
harmless, the majority interestingly counters this by reference to Reporters Committee's categorical balancing. The majority casually noted at
the end of its opinion that although there may be concern about allowing
material such as voice inflections to pass the threshold of Exemption 6,
"all but the most unusual assertion of authorial privacy would easily be
disposed of under the categorical approach to Exemption 6 claims, without any need to resort to ad hoc balancing." 15 1 In other words, the mate149. Id. at 1009. In Washington Post, the Supreme Court recognized:
The [Senate Judiciary] Committee concluded that the balancing of private against public
interests, not the nature of the files in which the information was contained, should limit
the scope of the exemption: "It is believed that the scope of the exemption is held within
bounds by the use of the limitation of 'a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.'"
Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982) (quoting S.REP. No. 813,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965)).
150. See supra notes 18, 25-26 and accompanying text. The dissent did not argue or even mention this crucial point.
151. New York Times, 920 F.2d at 1009 (citing Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776 (1989)).
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rial could involve such insignificant privacy interests that there could not
152
be "a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
Thus, the majority creates what amounts to "reverse categorical balancing" whereby a court may categorically balance certain types of requested information, by their very nature, infavor of disclosure. Such an
approach again illustrates the seemingly unlimited interpretations of Reporters Committee.
C. A Virtual IrrebuttablePresumption of Confidentiality Approaching
CategoricalNon-Disclosure Under Exemption 7(D)
Another access-restricting development occurred in 1990 within the
D.C. Circuit, this concerning Exemption 7(D). Exemption 7(D) exempts
from disclosure the identity of, and information furnished by, confiden154
tial sources in law enforcement investigations. 153 In Schmerler v. FBI
and Dow Jones & Co. v. Department of Justice 155 (a later decision affirming the approach outlined in Schmerler), the D.C. Circuit recognized, in effect, an "irrebuttable" presumption1 56 that FBI informants are
confidential sources under 7(D). The court will presume, and requesters
realistically will be unable to rebut, that the sources are confidential. The
records are thus exempt from the FOIA's mandatory disclosure provisions. The decisions are significant because the court has essentially cut
off citizen access to information concerning FBI informants.
1. Schmerler v. FBI. In Schmerler, the plaintiff (Schmerler) requested all information from the FBI that related to the FBI's investigation into the murder of his aunt. The murder occurred fifty-five years
prior to Schmerler's FOIA request.1 5 7 As part of the murder investigation, the FBI interviewed several of the victim's colleagues and friends
concerning the victim's character.15 8 The issue before the court of ap152. Id
153. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1988). Specifically, Exemption 7(D) provides in relevant part that
the mandatory disclosure requirements of the FOIA do not apply to:
records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that
the production of such law enforcement records or information ... could reasonably be
expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, ... and, in the case of a record or
information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal
investigation .... information furnished by a confidential source ....
Id. (emphases added).
154. 900 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
155. 917 F.2d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
156. Though the presumption is not technically irrebuttable, the court's handling of plaintiff's
rebuttal evidence, see infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text, indicates that the presumption is
virtually irrebuttable.
157. Schmerler, 900 F.2d at 334.
158. Id. at 334-35.
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peals was whether those character sources were confidential such that
their names were exempt from the FOIA's mandatory disclosure requirements under Exemption 7(D).15 9
To determine whether the sources were confidential, the court noted
that although Exemption 7(D) requires the government to demonstrate
that sources were assured confidentiality, "the FBI benefits from a presumption that an assurance of confidentiality was given where the circumstances indicate that the want of an assurance would impair its
ability to elicit information. Absent evidence to the contrary, promises of
confidentiality are inherently implicit when the FBI solicits information." 16° Consequently, whenever the FBI solicits information during a
law enforcement investigation, a strong presumption exists that the FBI
extended assurances of confidentiality to the sources of that information.
In the instant case, the court acknowledged that the FBI's claim
stood largely on the presumption of confidentiality because the government's evidence to prove that confidentiality was promised was weak. 161
Thus, the court placed the burden on Schmerler to rebut the presumption that confidentiality had been extended nearly sixty years earlier, stating that "[t]his burden may be met with evidence demonstrating that it
would be unreasonable to infer from the circumstancessurrounding the
interviews that confidentiality had been extended." 162
After shifting the burden to the plaintiff, the court next considered
the plaintiff's evidence to determine whether the sources were assured
confidentiality. Schmerler first asserted that there was no need for confidentiality because the interviewees provided innocuous and favorable
background and character information, were friendly to the FBI's investigation, had no reason to fear disclosure, had offered no clues to the
murder, and were not exposed to danger.1 63 The court rejected the evidence, however, stating that the evidence concerned the substance of the
interviews and not evidence of the circumstances surrounding the interviews, which the court had explicitly required to meet the burden. 164
Consequently, the requested names were held to be exempt.
159. Id. at 335-36.
160. Id. at 337 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Miller v. Bell, 661 F.2d 623, 627

(7th Cir. 1981) ("promises of confidentiality are inherently implicit in FBI interviews conducted
pursuant to a criminal investigation"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
161. Schmerler, 900 F.2d at 337.
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 337-38.
164. Id. at 338. The court arrived at this conclusion after recognizing that "'the availability of
Exemption 7(D) depends not upon the factual contents of the documents sought, but upon whether
the source was confidential and the information was compiled during a criminal investigation'" Id.
(quoting Shaw v. FBI, 749 F.2d 58, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
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In analyzing the significance of Schmerler, it is noteworthy that the
court placed the burden on the FOIA plaintiff-in this case the burden to
demonstrate that the FBI did not extend confidentiality nearly sixty years

earlier. The FOIA, however, explicitly states that "the burden is on the
agency to sustain its action.'

165

Shifting the burden to the plaintiff

presents a substantial obstacle for FOIA plaintiffs who challenge an
agency's Exemption 7(D) claim, making it easier for investigative agencies to circumvent the FOIA's goal of maximizing access. For instance,
it would appear more difficult for one to establish that a promise of confidentiality did not occur than to demonstrate that the promise did occur.
This is especially true under the facts in Schmerler, in which the plaintiff
was asked to demonstrate that confidentiality had not been extended

nearly sixty years earlier. Moreover, the government would seemingly be
in a better position to prove whether confidentiality had been extended
because requesters would rarely, if ever, be a direct party to the inter166
views in question.

Because the court shifted the burden to the plaintiff to rebut the
presumption of confidentiality, the court should have been receptive to
the plaintiff's evidence. This was not the case. The court rejected

Schnerler's evidence, stating that Exemption 7(D) does not depend on
"the factual contents of the documents sought."' 167 Although the availability of Exemption 7(D) may not depend on the factual contents of the
documents sought, such evidence would seem relevant to the court's ex-

plicit standard for rebuttal: "demonstrating that it would be unreasonable to infer from the circumstances surrounding the interviews that
Schmerler also argued that the sources would have anticipated that their identities would be
revealed because at the time the FBI expected that the sources might be called to testify at trial. Id
Thus, the need for confidentiality would be minimal. The court rejected this "potential witness
rule." Id. Contra Lame v. Department of Justice, 654 F.2d 917, 925 (3d Cir. 1981) ("If a source
expects he will, at some later date, publicly testify regarding the information he has provided, it may
be difficult to imply an assurance of confidentiality.").
165. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988) (emphasis added); see Dow Jones & Co. v. Department of
Justice, 917 F.2d 571, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., concurring) (Schmerler "seemingly disregarded" that the FOIA expressly provides that the burden is on the agency invoking FOIA exemption); see also S.REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8(1965) ("Placing the burden ofproofupon the
agency puts the task ofjustifying the withholding on the only party able to explain it.").
166. Although no current FBI employees may have been directly involved in the 1931 interviews
at issue, the agency itself was involved and therefore should shoulder the burden. The agency is
capable of, for example, creating a "paper trail" regarding confidential assurances. See Dow Jones &
Co. v. Department of Justice, 917 F.2d 571, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge
Edwards apparently endorses the view that because agencies possess information and records relevant to confidentiality, not only are agencies in a better position than requesters to show that sources
were confidential, but requesters are really in no position to rebut the government's claim.
167. Schmerler, 900 F.2d at 338; see supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text (describing
Schmerler's evidence).
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confidentiality had been extended." 168 It may be impossible to meet the
court's requirement without using the factual content of the interviews.
169
In addition, the court's rejection of the "potential witness rule"
seems unfair. Although the possibility of testifying at trial may not warrant a per se rule denying the existence of confidentiality, such evidence
may be relevant to demonstrate that it would be unreasonable to infer
from the circumstances surrounding the interviews that confidentiality
had been extended. Although possibly insufficient when weighed independently, when considered together, Schmerler's evidence appears sufficient to meet the court's burden to compel disclosure. Indeed, if
Schmerler's evidence is insufficient, one may wonder what evidence
would be acceptable to rebut the government's presumption. By shifting
the burden to the plaintiff and then critically examining and dismissing
plaintiff's evidence, the court moved beyond a mere presumption of confidentiality to a virtual irrebuttable presumption.
2. Dow Jones & Co. v. Department of Justice. The D.C. Circuit
affirmed the approach outlined in Schmerler in Dow Jones & Co. v. Department of Justice.1 70 In that case, Dow Jones & Company, Inc. ("Dow
Jones") sought access to portions of a letter sent by the DOJ to the
House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.1 71 The letter contained a summary of the results of the DOJ's investigation into possible
criminal activity by a member of Congress.1 72 Although the DOJ declined to prosecute, the letter (indicating that the investigation had uncovered evidence of improper behavior by the Congressman) contained
information from DOJ interviews that occurred during the investigation. 173 The DOJ denied the request.
The D.C. Circuit considered whether Exemption 7(D) applied to the
information received from witnesses during the course of the FBI interviews. 174 Although noting that "[a]s with the other FOIA exemptions,
'the burden is on the agency to sustain its action [under Exemption
7(D)],' ,"175 the court nevertheless stated: "But as we reiterated just recently in Schmerler . . . 'the law of this Circuit is that in the absence of
168. Schmerler, 900 F.2d at 337.
169. See supra note 164.
170. 917 F.2d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
171. Id. at 572.
172. Id. The target of the investigation was Fernand 3. St. Germain, who at that time was
Chairperson of the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 575.
175. Id. at 576 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988)).
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evidence to the contrary, promises of confidentiality are inherently implicit when the FBI solicits information.' "176
Dow Jones asserted evidence to rebut the presumption of confidentiality, and claimed that the FBI sources "merely described to the FBI
matters which presumably occurred in public view." 177 In response to
this evidence, the court stated: "We doubt that those who witness a congressman's public behavior-whether other congressmen, lobbyists, or
restaurant employees-would typically appreciate being identified as the
FBI's witnesses. Public behavior of the congressman is one thing; public
identification of the witnesses is quite another." 178 Thus, the court concluded that the sources were confidential.
Dow Jones' evidence, like Schmerler's, would seem to meet the
Schmerler burden of "demonstrating that it would be unreasonable to
infer from the circumstances surrounding the interviews that confidentiality had been extended." 17 9 The court, however, failed to refer to the
foregoing standard set forth in Schmerler, stating simply that it doubted
whether, in the typical situation, individuals would appreciate being
identified as witnesses to a Congressman's public behavior. It is unlikely
that Congress would draft an exemption to disclosure that specifically
requires that sources be confidential, and support this provision with a
general mandate that places the burden on the agency to demonstrate
that it has met the exemption's requirements, yet really mean that confidentiality is presumed, with the burden on the plaintiff to rebut the presumption. It is perhaps more unlikely that Congress would believe
176. Id. (quoting Schmerler v. FBI, 900 F.2d 333, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). In a footnote, the
court acknowledged that Schmerler strengthened the presumption employed in Keys v. Department
of Justice, 830 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1987): "But for the presumption, which Schmerler, in truth,
strengthened over that employed in Keys, the case would have come out the other way; the government's actual evidence of confidentiality was rather thin." Dow Jones, 917 F.2d at 576 n.4.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Edwards argued that the "implied confidentiality" approach,
utilized in Keys (prior to Schmerler) was a better approach than Schmerler's practically irrebuttable
presumption. See id at 578 (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Edwards noted that Keys "found
implied assurances of confidentiality only upon identifying specific circumstances supporting the inference that confidentiality was necessary to elicit information." Id. Judge Edwards was critical of
Schmerler's use of Keys to support the use of a practically irrebuttable presumption. He noted that
Keys did not suggest that the FOIA plaintiff has the burden of disproving assurances of confidentiality. Moreover, "[t]he statement in Keys from which Schmerler derives its presumption of confidentiality-that 'promises of confidentiality [are] inherently implicit' in FBI interviews-merely reports
one of the standards in use in other circuits." Id (quoting Keys, 830 F.2d at 345-46).
177. Dow Jones, 917 F.2d at 576. Dow Jones claimed that the sources informed the FBI merely
of the names of persons with whom and where the Congressman had dined. In the absence of
personal or business ties between the sources and the Congressman, Dow Jones argued that there
was no reason to believe that the sources wanted confidentiality. Id.
178. Id. The court further stated that "[wle think appellant's claim regarding all the witnesses is
even weaker than that rejected in Schmerler." Id.
179. Schmerler, 900 F.2d at 337.
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confidentiality would be established merely by a court's doubt that witnesses would appreciate being publicly identified as witnesses.
To be sure, the court did not pretend that plaintiffs who contest
agency use of Exemption 7(D) had much chance of prevailing:
We readily admit that the presumption we applied in Keys, and especially in Schmerler, in practical terms comes close to an irrebuttable
one. The requester will rarely, if ever, have absolutely solid evidence
showing that the source of an FBI interview in a law enforcement investigation has manifested complete disregard for confidentiality.1 0
At this point, one may begin to recognize a similarity between this essentially "irrebuttable" presumption and the categorical approach used by
the Supreme Court in Reporters Committee.Ill Indeed, referring to the
Court's comment that "categorical decisions may be appropriate,"18 2 the
Dow Jones court believed that by applying an irrebuttable presumption
that all FBI sources interviewed in law enforcement investigations were
confidential sources, it was "merely following the direction the Supreme
' ' 18 3
Court gave [it] in Reporters Committee.
Was the D.C. Circuit merely following the Court's direction? Ai
previously discussed, it is not clear whether the Court provided directions on categorical balancing for the lower courts to follow. 18 4 It is entirely plausible that, in dicta, the Court recognized categorical balancing
as a means to an end solely to justify its holding in Reporters Committee.
Regardless, even if one were confident that the Court condoned categorical analysis generally under Exemption 7(C), such an authorization
would not appear to encompass Exemption 7(D). The apparent "direction giving" statement in Reporters Committee to which the D.C. Circuit
referred was a comment by the Court that "categorical decisions may be
appropriate and individual circumstances disregarded when a case fits
into a genus in which the balance characteristicallytips in one direction. "185 The balance to which the Court referred is the Exemption 7(C)
public interest/personal privacy balance. Thus, if the Court is indeed
authorizing categorical non-disclosure, it appears to be limited to Exemption 7(C),1 86 which perhaps explains why the Court refers to the ap187
proach as categorical balancing.
180. Dow Jones, 917 F.2d at 577.
181. See Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749
(1989); see also supra notes 19-20, 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing Reporters Committee's
categorical approach).
182. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 776.
183. Dow Jones, 917 F.2d at 577.
184. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
185. Reporters Committee 489 U.S. at 776 (emphasis added).
186. And perhaps Exemption 6. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.

187. See Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 778.
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Moreover, significant differences exist between the categorical approach utilized in ReportersCommittee and that suggested in Dow Jones.
First, by categorically exempting rap sheets the Supreme Court exempted
a particular type of information. The Court utilized this approach as a
surrogate for subjective weighing of intangible factors-personal privacy
and public interests-by judges on a case-by-case basis. 188 Exemption
7(D), however, does not involve such a subjective judgment. A court
must determine simply whether the agency interviewed the sources for
law enforcement purposes or in the course of a criminal investigation,
and whether those sources received assurances of confidentiality. The
objectiveness of these determinations obviates categorical decision189
making.
A second reason why applying a categorical approach under Exemption 7(C) is more justifiable than under Exemption 7(D) is that when
the Court categorically balanced under Exemption 7(C), it left intact the
scheme of balancing privacy interests against the public interest in disclosure. The Court noted that for certain types of information-rap
sheets-the balance will always tip in the direction of withholding.
Outside of rap sheets, however, balancing is still required.
A categorical approach under Exemption 7(D), on the other hand,
has the effect of striking language from the FOIA. By concluding that
information solicited during law enforcement investigations is categorically confidential, courts would render superfluous the language of Exemption 7(D), which requires that the requested information be
"furnished by a confidential source." 190 Congress could have easily
19 1
omitted the adjective "confidential" in the exemption, but it did not.
Upon losing on appeal in the D.C. Circuit, Dow Jones sought an en
banc rehearing, which was denied. 192 Judge Silberman, joined by Judge
188. Indeed, Reporters Committee noted that "[t]he Court of Appeals majority expressed concern about assigning federal judges the task of striking a proper case-by-case, or ad hoc, balance
between individual privacy interests and the public interest in the disclosure of criminal-history information without providing those judges standards to assist in performing that task." Id. at 776.
189. But see infra note 194 (Judge Silberman, concurring in the denial of a rehearing en bane,
argued that categorical determinations made under Exemption 7(D) will alleviate problems associated with subjective, ad hoc decisionmaking. Dow Jones, 917 F.2d at 579).

190. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(D) (1988).
191. See Dow Jones, 917 F.2d at 577 (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Edwards was not con-

vinced that the government satisfied the statutory burden merely by demonstrating that the FBI
interview occurred during a criminal investigation, because such an interpretation would contradict
the language of Exemption 7(D), which permits withholding "'only if the information is 'furnished by
a confidential source.'" Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1988)). It is arguable that the Dow
Jones presumption applies only to FBI sources, because those are the sources to which the court
refers in its holding. Perhaps other records compiled by a criminal law enforcement agency contain
information furnished by non-FBI sources.
192. Id. at 578.
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Williams, concurred in the court's order, claiming that "the presumption
[of confidentiality] is directed, strictly speaking, not at the burden of
proof, but at the quantum of evidence necessary to carry the burden.
Fixing the burden of proof on a party is plainly not inconsistent with a
93
substantive rule identifying specific facts that will carry the burden."'
However, although the presumption is technically directed at the quantum of evidence necessary to carry the burden, the effect is the same:
The burden of proof is inevitably carried by the plaintiff. Indeed,
although the government may, have the burden, the plaintiff bears the
burden. 194
3. Conclusion The presumption of confidentiality represents a
product of judicial legislation. 195 However, even if courts were to exercise restraint and reject the "irrebuttable" presumption in favor of a
more lenient "implied confidentiality" standard, there is no guarantee
that a court would not achieve the same result-finding an assurance of
confidentiality-by according great deference to the government's case.
Moreover, the court's "irrebuttable" presumption, although perhaps in

violation of the language of Exemption 7(D), would protect those sources
who were assured or who expected confidentiality where the government,

by lapse of time or mistake, is unable to prove its case. In any event, the
decisions ultimately restrict the public's access to certain information regardless of how important that information is to the particular requester
193. Id at 579 (citation omitted).
194. Judge Silberman attempted to justify the strong presumption, contending:
[Tihe FBI would routinely be compelled to produce evidence as to the particular expectations of the interviewee and the agent, and we would be obliged on a case-by-case basis to
try to determine just how much confidentiality qualifies as a 'confidential source.'... [W]e
seek to avoid ad hoc decisionmaking.
Id Contra id.at 580 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (Judge Edwards, joined by then-Chief Judge Wald
and Judge Mikva, rejected Judge Silberman's theory that the Schmerler presumption was justified to
reduce administrative and judicial burdens: "Burdensome or not, we are constrained to enforce the
statute as it was written by Congress.").
Judge Silberman concluded with a reference to Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776 (1989): "Because at least some element of confidentiality is
virtually always present, [Reporters Committee] counsels that we treat such questions generically."
917 F.2d at 579 (emphasis added). But see supra note 38 and accompanying text (arguing that it is
not obvious that Reporters Committee authorized mass categorization).
195. See Dow Jones, 917 F.2d at 580. Judge Edwards referred to Schmerler as a "rather remarkable example ofjudicial intervention" and an "example of judicial fiat." Id. He concluded that the
perils of the majority's course are quite plain:
"[I]f courts were free to 'correct' what they believe to be congressional oversights by construing unambiguous statutes to the contrary of their plain meaning-apart from that rare
case in which specific legislative history compels such a result--even a good faith attempt
to further Congress's goals would open the way to judicial hijacking of the power to legislate." It is not the role of this court to rewrite statutes to satisfy the legislative policy
preferences of the judges.
Id (quoting Consolidated Rail Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
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or to the general public. In light of the congressional intent to maximize

public access to agency records, the scale should tip in favor of the
public.
III.

ADMINISTRATIVE VIEWPOINTS ON ELECTRONIC

FOIA IssuES

In recent years, federal agencies have become increasingly computerized. With this mass computerization, significant issues are raised
under the FOIA, which was written to apply to the paper record systems
in place when it was enacted twenty-four years ago. 19 6 In 1990, the
DOJ's Office of Information and Privacy (OIP) published the results of a
government-wide survey1 97 commenced in May 1989 by the DOJ to collect information from individual agencies on agency positions and practices regarding electronic record issues under the FOIA.19 8 The OIP
conducted the survey to establish a framework for future uniform government policies concerning electronic FOIA issues. 199 The attention
was warranted because the FOIA does not contain any language regarding its application to electronic records. In the absence of any statutory
language to guide the agencies, and in light of the fact that the DOJ's
guidance over the agencies on FOIA matters is noncompulsory, agency
unwillingness to search or disclose electronic records will significantly
dilute the effect of the FOIA in this largely electronic world. 200
196. "Much of the difficulty with 'electronic record' issues under the FOIA stems from the fact
that Congress could barely envision federal agencies operating in an 'electronic environment' at the
time at which the Act was designed." Office of Information and Privacy, Department of Justice,
Department of JusticeReport on "ElectronicRecord" FOIA Issuer"Part I FOIA UPDATE, Spring/
Summer 1990, at 3, 4 [hereinafter DOJ Report Part1].
197. DOI Report PartI, supra note 196, at 3; Office of Information and Privacy, Department of
Justice, Department ofJustice Report on "ElectronicRecord" FOIA Issues PartII, FOIA UPDATE,
Fall 1990, at 3 [hereinafter DOJ Report Part I].
198. See Office of Information and Privacy, Department of Justice, OIP Takes "ElectronicRecord" Survey, FOIA UPDATE, Spring 1989, at 1.
199. DOJ Report Part I supra note 196, at 3. The OIP conducted the survey against the backdrop of recent administrative, legislative, and judicial focus on and concern regarding the application
of the FOIA in an electronic world. See eg., HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
ELECTRONIC COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION BY FEDERAL AGENCIES: A
POLICY OVERVIEW, H.R. REP. No. 560,99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMING THE NATION: FEDERAL INFORMATION DISSEMINATION IN AN
ELECTRONIC AGE (1988) [hereinafter INFORMING THE NATION]; H. PERRFrT, JR., ELECTRONIC

ACQUISITION AND RELEASE OF FEDERAL AGENCY INFORMATION (1988) (report for Administra-

tive Conference of the United States); FederalInformation DisseminationPolicies & Practice: Hearings Before the Government Information, Justice & Agriculture Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Government Operation, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
200. Although Congress has not provided any reference to electronic records in the FOIA itself,
various committee reports have indicated that the FOIA should apply to electronic records as it does
to conventional records. See, eg., H.R. Rep. No. 560, supra note 199; see alsoinfra text accompanying notes 243-50 (discussing H.R. REP. No. 927, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)).
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The existence of electronic record systems in federal agencies raises
significant issues concerning the responsibilities of agencies that handle
FOIA requests. For example, does computer information constitute an
"agency record," thereby subjecting it to the mandatory disclosure provisions of the FOIA?20 1 Additionally, must an agency perform new computer programming when searching for, processing, or producing records
maintained in electronic form? 20 2 To assess agency opinion and practice
relating to these and other electronic issues, the OIP survey identified
four major issues for agency comment:
A. Does the FOIA require agencies to create new computer programs
(or modify existing programs) for search purposes, i.e., in order to
search for and retrieve electronic records according to the particular
specifications of FOIA requesters?
B. Does the FOIA require agencies to create new computer programs
(or modify existing programs) for "processing" purposes, i.e., in order
to segregate disclosable from nondisclosable electronic record
portions?
C. Does the FOIA require agencies to provide requested records in the
particular forms (or database formats) specified by requesters? 20 3
D. Is computer software an "agency record" under the FOIA?
Because the FOIA lacks any language regarding electronic issues, the
most important responses (in terms of public access) are those from agencies that expressed opposition to an "electronic FOIA."
A.

Search and Retrieval of Electronic Records

The FOIA requires that agencies responding to a FOIA request conduct a reasonable search for requested information. 2°4 The first survey
issue arose out of a recognition that searching obligations will probably
differ when an agency maintains an electronic record system. A conventional record system usually consists of paper records stored in individual
files indexed according to specific prearranged subject matter. An agency
search and retrieval in response to a FOIA request is limited to the way
that the agency normally searches its files in the course of its opera201. The FOIA's mandatory disclosure provisions grant access to "agency records." See 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988). However, the Act does not define the term "agency records" and the
legislative history is unclear on this point. See McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1106, modified in
other respects; 711 F.2d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Thus, the meaning of the term "agency record" is a
frequently litigated issue. See generally Note, The Definition of "'Agency Records" Under the Freedom of Information Act, 31 STAN. L. RaV. 1093 (1979) (discussing the uncertainty regarding the
meaning of "agency record").
202. See DOJ Report Part I, supra note 196, at 3.

203. Id. at 6.
204. Truitt v. Department of State, 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1990). A question arises as to
what extent agencies are obligated to go in order to "reasonably" search an electronic record system.
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tions.2°5 With an electronic system, however, there exists far greater flexibility and capability to search files through the use of computer
programming. 20 6 Yet if a FOIA request cannot be located under the
agency's existing search techniques, the agency will generally deny the
request.
The OIP recognized that retrieving information in an electronic system could result in the creation of new programming. 2 7 Furthermore,
the OIP cautioned that, although electronic searches may not involve
much effort in comparison to conventional searches, "the potential uses
of 'electronic' agency file systems by sophisticated FOIA requesters are
seemingly unlimited-as are the corresponding burdens that such uses
'20 8
could place upon federal agencies.
Of the seventy agencies that responded to the first survey issue, fiftythree (75.7%) opposed a requirement that agencies perform new programming to search for requested records. 2 °9 Agencies voicing opposition indicated a concern that new programming requirements would
result in a significant administrative burden, in terms of their limited resources and their ability to conduct their statutory duties. 2 10 Several
agencies that voiced opposition to the programming requirement believed that the "reasonableness" standard could apply to electronic
205. For example, the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") may maintain a file under the
subject-matter heading "public offerings" (with a record of each individual public offering that occurred in the past 20 years), and another under the heading "underwriters" (containing the names
and addresses of all underwriters). The "public offerings" file may contain information regarding
the offering corporation's past and current underwriters. However, a request for "all public offerings
ever handled by Merrill Lynch" would not be accessible under the existing subject-matter indexing
system without digging through records of every public offering listed in the "public offering" file.
With thousands of public offerings on file, the search for the requested records would be unreasonable. See generally Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("It is firmly
established that an agency is not required to reorganize [its] fies in response to [a plaintiff's] request
in the form in which it was made.") (quotations omitted).
206. In the SEC example, supra note 205, an electronic system would allow the SEC to merely
type "Merrill Lynch" and "public offering" to obtain the requested information.
207. DOJ Report PartI, supra note 196, at 11. "In any event, they involve a manner of 'creational'*activity that, to say the least, federal agencies are generally unaccustomed to regarding as
within their basic FOIA responsibilities." Id See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 186 (1980)
("the FOIA imposes no duty on [agencies] to create records") (citing NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1975)); Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S.
136, 152 & n.7 (1980) (same). Thus, although electronic searches may, in many cases, involve little
time or effort, the agency would technically be creating a new record, which they are not obligated to
do under the FOIA.
208. DOJ Report Part I, supra note 196, at 12.
209. Id. at 14.
210. Id. Not all agencies were adamantly opposed to the idea; some indicated a willingness to
conduct broader, but not unlimited, searches of electronic record systems. Id. at 15.
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FOIA searches, but were concerned with the uncertain application of
that standard. 2 11
B. ProcessingElectronic Records
The second issue of the OIP study was "whether agencies are obligated to engage in computer programming for the purposes of 'processing' electronic records under the [FOIA]." 212 Processing occurs in cases

in which agencies, after they locate a requested record, must excise exempt portions and disclose non-exempt portions.2 13 With conventional
paper records, deleting portions of a record involves the straightforward
alteration of a copied page. With electronic records, however, processing

is not as simple. Electronic records consist of "electronic impulses" that
cannot be manipulated in the same manner as the information printed on
a piece of paper. 214 Although an agency could circumvent this problem
by printing out the electronic information in conventional form and then
processing the information in a conventional manner, the problem re-

mains when records are requested in electronic form. Under such a scenario, a question arises whether an agency must engage in computer

programming

2 15

to delete exempt portions before disclosing the

remainder.
The overall agency response to the second survey question was similar to that expressed for the first survey issue.2 16 Thirty-three of the seventy responding (47.1%) agencies opposed a computer programming
requirement for processing purposes; many expressed the administrative
concerns reflected in the responses to the first survey issue. 2 17 Not all
agencies agreed, however, that the requirement would necessarily result
211. Id at 16. The OIP cited a study of electronic record FOIA issues, conducted by the Office
of Technology Assessment, that recognized that" 'drawing lines between reasonable degrees of effort
is a dificult task."' Id. at 16 n.20 (quoting INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 199, at 229). The
American Bar Association and the Administrative Conference of the United States, however, recommend a reasonableness standard. Id.
Three agencies (4.3%) indicated no opposition to a requirement of computer programming for
electronic record searches. Fourteen agencies (20%) indicated no opinion on the issue. Id. at 14.
212. Id. at 17.
213. Id. The processing function is required by the language of the FOIA, which provides that
"[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such
record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under [the Act]." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
214. DOJ Report Part I, supra note 196, at 18.
215. Id. The OIP noted that in some circumstances, "where agencies have extensive data-retrieval capabilities built into their 'electronic' record systems, the task of segregating exempt from
nonexempt information actually can be a simple one that should raise no 'processing' issue ...
because the tasks of data retrieval and data segregation can be, in effect, one and the same." Id.
216. Id. at 20. For a full discussion of the responses to the second issue, see id. at 20-21.
217. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 210.
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in a larger burden. Some agencies indicated that computer programming
21 8
for processing purposes had already been utilized in some situations.
C.

Requester Preference of Form

The third survey issue concerned "whether the [FOIA] requires federal agencies to provide requested records in a particular specified form
or format," as dictated by a requesters particular preference. 2 19 The OIP
recognized that choice of format questions can arise even in the context
of conventional records, because agencies have maintained records in
many forms other than paper records. 220 In the electronic context, however, "records can take the widely varying forms of magnetic tapes, disks
and other devices... [that] can vary greatly in their basic format, technical configuration and operational design-which in turn can yield significant differences in compatibility with various automated data-processing
systems. ' 221 If a requested record is incompatible with a particular requester's data-processing system, the record will be unreadable and,
therefore, useless. Moreover, for a requester to convert the record into a
compatible form could be costly and time-consuming.
The OIP noted that the choice of format issue arises in two situations. The first arises when an agency maintains information requested
under the FOIA in more than one format, whether electronic, conventional, or both. Here, the issue is whether the FOIA entitles the re222
quester to choose among the alternatives maintained by the agency.
The second situation arises when an agency maintains requested information in only one form, and the agency would have to put the information
223
in a different form to satisfy a request.
In response to the choice of format issue, a majority of the agencies
(forty-one of the seventy agencies responding (58.57%)) opposed a requirement that agencies must yield to the requester's choice. 224 Many of
these agencies were concerned with the potential administrative cost and
218. DOJ Report Part I, supra note 196, at 20. For example, the Federal Trade Commission
explained that, with its system, "it is more efficient... to segregate information electronically than
to produce a complete paper record of the requested information and then delete the nondisclosable
information." Id. at 21.

Half of the agencies indicated no position on the issue, which apparently reflects little agency
consideration of the issue. Only two agencies (2.86%) indicated no opposition to the requirement.

Id. at 20.
219. DOJ Report Part I1 supra note 197, at 3.

220. See id. Microfilm and microfiche are two examples.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.; see, eg., Dismukes v. Department of the Interior, 603 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984).
DOJ Report Part II, supra note 197, at 4.
Id at 5.
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burden of such a requirement. 225 Most favored broad agency discretion
on the choice of format issue, although many indicated that agency dis226
cretion should be limited by a "reasonableness" standard.
D. Are Computer Software Programs "'Agency Records"?
The fourth survey issue, whether software constitutes an "agency
record" such that it is subject to the FOIA's mandatory disclosure requirement, was and still is complicated by the fact that the FOIA does
not define the term "agency record." 227 Moreover, the OIP noted that a
further complication is that the definition of the term "software" is
imprecise. 228
Considering whether software constitutes a "record," the OIP
stated:
A "record" is generally understood to be a medium of one form or
another on which information is recorded in order to preserve its content. If computer software is of such character that it does not itself
serve to record information, but rather serves merely as the means by
which recorded information is manipulated within an automated dataprocessing system, then is it a "record" under the FOIA at all?
Thus, the question is whether they are most properly regarded as
vessels of information (like data), on the one hand, or as mere tools
229
(like hardware), on the other.
Even assuming that software is a "record," the 01P questioned
whether software has the proper connection with an agency to constitute
an "agency record." Supreme Court precedent holds that a record is an
"agency record" if it is both in that agency's possession and within its
control. 230 Although possession is usually undisputed, the question of
"control" is more difficult:
225. Id
226. Id at 5, 6. The OIP noted that "[o]veral... the survey responses indicated very little
agency experience in dealing with [the choice of format] issue to date." See id at 5. Of the remaining responding agencies, 27 (38.57%) expressed no opinion, whereas only two agencies (2.86%)
favored a requirement that allowed requesters a choice of format. Id
227. See supra note 201.
228. See DOJ Report PartII, supra note 197, at 7. The OIP stated:
In common parlance, computer "software" is generally understood to be the preprogrammed set of instructions according to which data is mechanically manipulated in a computer
or in some type of automated data-processing equipment. Usually it takes the form of a
disk or tape that has been constructed or patterned in such a way as to achieve a precise
result when used together with accompanying "hardware."
Id (footnote omitted).
229. Id at 7-8 (citation omitted).
230. Id. at 8 (citing Forshan v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 171, 173 (1980) and Kissinger v. Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 151, 157 (1980)).
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To determine the question of "control," . . .consideration must be

given to the circumstances under which an item of computer software
came into an agency's possession.
...Put

most simply, the issue is whether [an] outside proprietary

interest-holder has lawfully retained sufficient control over that
software to render any requested FOIA disclosure beyond the agency's

own legal power. Consideration of this issue requires an analysis of the
factual 1circumstances and legal conditions involved in each particular
23
case.

Because most agencies obtain software through contractual agreements

that may limit the agency's use of that software while maintaining control with the software's owner, a legal question arises whether sufficient
232
control is extended.

Of the seventy agencies that responded to the issue, thirteen
(18.57%) believed that software does not constitute an "agency record,"
and regarded software as "nothing more than a 'tool' used for the manipulation of data. '2 33 Many of these agencies expressed concern about

software constituting an "agency record," because agencies frequently
use commercially-developed software with licensing restrictions and

copyright protections. 234 In addition, many of these agencies expressed
235
concern over the security of the government computer systems.
E. Conclusion
Although the 0IP concluded its report with its belief that the study

"should provide a firm foundation" to deal with electronic record issues

236
in the future, agency viewpoints must be taken with a grain of salt.

Most agencies would rather maintain discretion over access to their
records, both out of a concern over the substance of their information,
and because the FOIA presents a real administrative burden and cost.
231. Id. (citation omitted).
232. Id at 9.
233. Id at 10.
234. Id at 11.
235. Id at 12. For example, the Selective Service System was concerned that computer "hackers,"
if able to examine internal programs, could create viruses to infect the agency's programs. Id.
Twenty-two agencies (31.4%) expressed that software should be considered an "agency record," at least in some situations. Half of the agencies expressed no position. The OIP attributes this
result to possible limited agency experience with the issue. Id at 10.
236. Representative Bob Wise (D-W.Va.) criticized the OIP's survey in a letter to Attorney
General Thornburgh. Wise complained about the way the survey was structured, noting:
[Tihe [DOJ's] response to these difficult problems was to take a survey of the views of
federal agencies on some of the legal issues involved. Questions of legal interpretation must
be decided with reference to the law. Opinion polls have no probative value.... [G]iven
the history of agency indifference or outright hostility to the disclosure of information, it
cannot be surprising to anyone that agencies generally favor any interpretation of the law
that reduces agency disclosure obligations .... [Tihe [DOJ] report also exemplifies the
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Nevertheless, with increased computerization of federal agencies, agency
policies toward electronic FOIA issues, in the absence of a specific legis-

lative mandate, will continue to impact significantly the public's ability to
access computerized records. If Congress does not outline a specific and
uniform policy by amending the FOIA, agency opinion, as evidenced by
the OIP study, may render the FOIA practically useless in the increasingly electronic world.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE

FOIA

IN

1990

In 1990 the House passed the Paperwork Reduction and Federal
Information Resources Management Act of 1990237 (bill), a bill that, if
enacted, would have both a direct and indirect impact on the future application of the FOIA. The bill is significant for two reasons: It articulates a policy regarding electronic information, and it would shift
administrative guidance of the FOIA from the DOJ to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Although the bill was not enacted into
law, 2 38 the possibility of the bill's reintroduction warrants attention.
A.

Title L A Legislative Opinion Regarding the Application of the
FOJA to Electronic Records

The bill represents an amendment to and expansion of the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980,239 a law designed "to minimize the
paperwork burden and maximize the usefulness of information collected
by the Federal government. ' 240 Title I of the bill, although retaining the

Paperwork Reduction Act's focus on the reduction of paperwork, expands the 1980 legislation by establishing certain information dissemination policies for federal agencies. 241 The addition of statutory
dissemination policies stems from a recognition that information technology has changed with the advent of agency electronic systems. 242

conflict of interest that necessarily arises when litigation and policy functions are combined
in the same agency [(the DOJ)].
AccEs REP., Jan. 9, 1991, at 12-13. See infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text (noting how the
House amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act would shift FOIA guidance functions from the
DOJ to the OMB because of the conflict of interest in the DOJ).
237. H.R. 3695, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. 11,895-906 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1990).
238. The Senate failed to pass the bill before the end of the session.
239. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended
at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1988)).
240. H.R. REP.No. 927, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1990).
241. Id. at 16, 20.
242. Id. at 24. The Report accompanying the bill noted:
Technology is raising issues that existing laws simply do not clearly address .... The
dissemination amendments made by [the bill] are intended to bring the [Paperwork Reduction] Act squarely into the electronic information age by encouraging Federal agencies to
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Although the bill does not directly amend the FOIA in the context of
electronic information, its accompanying policies would affect the FOIA
in that context.
The Committee on Government Operations' (Committee) Report
that accompanied the bill explicitly recognizes the connection between
the bill and the FOIA in that both reflect the policy of providing the
public with government information. 24 3 However, the FOIA and the bill
take different approaches to fulfill that policy: The FOIA is an access
statute, whereas the bill focuses on dissemination. 244 More importantly,
the Report makes clear that policies concerning electronic information
24 5
under the bill are equally applicable to the FOIA:
Some consideration was given to the need to amend the FOIA to provide more specifically for public access to electronic records....
The Committee agrees that the FOIA currently is broad enough
to support public access to the electronic records ....

The FOIA al-

ready requires agencies to accept FOIA requests for electronic records
without any distinctions based on content. The FOIA already requires
agencies to conduct thorough searches of electronic records using all
reasonable means, including electronic searches and programming
techniques. The FOIA generally requires agencies to make copies of
electronic records available in paper format or in electronic formats
depending on the needs of the requester. An electronic data base is
clearly an agency record ....

disseminate information in electronic formats and in other formats that will be useful to

public users.
Id.
243. See id at 25-27.
244. Id. at 25. The Report explains:
"Dissemination" refers to the distribution of government information to the public
through printed documents or through electronic and other media, independent of a legal
obligation to respond to a request from the public for the information.... While related in
purpose and sometimes in practice, the functions can be analyzed separately.... To the
extent that public needs are not fulfilled by an agency's dissemination activities, the access
provisions of the FOIA may be used to fulfill those needs.
Id.
245. The bill explicitly provides that the dissemination obligations supplement, but do not replace, the provisions of the FOIA. H.R. 3695, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 103(d) (1990). The Senate
Report accompanying the Senate proposal to amend the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, S. 1742,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), stated:
mhe [Senate] bill requires that information dissemination policy developed by ... any
federal agency applies to all government publications in any format (i.e. paper, compact

disc, on-line data, etc.).
This change arose because the Committee recognized that the federal government is
operating in the electronic information age, and is utilizing alternative information formats
on a rapidly increasing basis. The law has not kept pace with these changes. The federal
information infrastracture [sic] requires the development of information policies which
take into account the advantages and consequences of advances in information technology.
S. REP. No. 487, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1990).
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The dissemination [provisions of the bill] underscore the importance of public access to electronic records in support of the existing
2 46

principles of the FOIA.
The foregoing passage is significant in that it reflects a legislative

opinion that favors access to electronic information under the FOIA. 247
First, the Committee endorses the view that electronic information constitutes an "agency record." 248 Second, the Committee believes that the
FOIA requires agencies to conduct searches for electronic information.
Third, the Committee also believes that FOIA requesters may choose the
format of their requests, provided that such requests are not
unreasonable.24 9

In conclusion, Title I of the bill, although actually dealing with affirmative dissemination obligations as opposed to public access, could af-

fect future FOIA disclosure requirements in the realm of electronic
records.2 50 The Committee's emphasis on the importance of the public

receiving significant government information, and of receiving that information in a manner that fits the public's needs, may influence agency
246. H.R. REP. No. 927, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1990) (footnotes omitted). The Report
further indicates that agency dissemination of electronic records under the bill may curtail the
number of FOIA requests by encouraging the agencies to disseminate more information. See Id. at
27.
247. But cf supra text accompanying note 199 (OIP implies that all of these issues are

unresolved).
248. The Report states that "[i]mpulses on electronic media, like words and drawing on paper,
are records for purposes of the FOIA and may be requested." H.R. REP. No. 927, supra note 246,
at 26 n.24.
249. The Report, pointing to Dismukes v. Department of the Interior, 603 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C.
1984) (holding that FOIA requesters do not have a choice of format), notes the controversy over
whether the FOIA allows a requester a choice of format. The Report notes the Committee's view
that Dismukes was wrongly decided, see HR. REP. No. 927, supra note 246, at 26, probably "be.
cause of a lack of judicial understanding of modem information technology .... " Id. at 26 n.26.
Thus, the Committee's view is that "the FOIA permits the requester a choice of obtaining information in any format that an agency can reasonably provide. The affirmative dissemination obligation
in [the bill] ends any remaining controversy by emphasizing the importance of making data available
in formats that will be useful to users." Id at 26 n.25.
250. In the context of electronic records, the Report cited a previous Committee
recommendation:
A Federal agency's-responsibility to provide for public use of agency records should not be
considered to be fixed or fully satisfied at any point in time. Public access is a dynamic
concept. If an agency has developed the ability to manipulate data electronically, it is
unfair to restrict the public to paper documents....
' *A] Federal agency should use modem technology to improve the range and the
quality of public access to agency records. As technology permits an agency to upgrade its
own ability to access, copy, and manipulate data, an agency should make reasonable attempts to allow public users of agency information to share the benefits of automation.
Id. at 44 (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, ELECTRONIC COLLECTION AND
DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION BY FEDERAL AGENCIES: A POLICY OVERVIEW, H.R. REP. No.
560, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 11 (1986)). Furthermore, the Committee stated that "[r]eleasing information in electronic formats allows the data to be used more effectively and by more people." Id.
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treatment of electronic requests under the FOIA. At the very least, these
policies may influence courts that review an agency's denial of a request
for electronic agency records. However, in the absence of an express
amendment to the FOIA, agencies are essentially free to apply their own
policies, which will likely curtail access and promote unnecessary
litigation.
B.

Shifting FOA Administrative Guidancefrom the DOJ to the OMB

Title II of the bill, entitled "Federal Government Information Technology," contains a provision that would amend the FOIA 251 by striking
the sentence in the FOIA that requires that the annual FOIA report submitted by the DOJ to "include a description of the efforts undertaken by
the Department of Justice to encourage agency compliance with [the
FOIA]. ' 25 2 Instead, the bill shifts the administrative oversight fumction
to the 0MB.
The Committee Report explains that the DOJ had previously issued
253
administrative guidance over the FOIA based on implied authority.
In the 1986 FOIA amendments, however, "Congress assigned OMB the
responsibility to promulgate guidelines providing for a uniform schedule
of fees."' 25 4 Thus, with both the OMB and the DOJ issuing guidance
over the FOIA, a conflict has arisen, leading to "confusion and excessive
bureaucracy in the FOIA administrative process. ' 255 The Report states
that Congress deliberately did not assigni guidance over the FOIA to the
DOJ in the 1986 FOIA amendments and that the bill's amendment com256
pletes the shift of the guidance function to the OMB.
In addition to the benefits of centralizing FOIA guidance in one
agency, the Report provides another reason for removing the DOJ's authority to encourage agency compliance with the FOIA: the elimination
of "an inherent conflict of interest that arises from the Department's litigation responsibilities under the FOIA." 25 7 Because the DOJ represents
all agencies in FOIA litigation, and that the goal of litigators is to win
cases, the DOJ could not be expected to provide neutral and unbiased
251. Paperwork Reduction and Federal Information Resources Management Act, H.R. 3695,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 204(b)(1), 136 CONG. REc. 11,901 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1990).
252. 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1988).
253. H.R. REP. No. 927, supra note 246, at 65.
254. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i) (1988)).

255. lIa
256. Id. The Commission believes that centralizing all FOIA guidance at the OMB will simplify
agency use of the FOIA.
257. Id. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (1972) (noting the DOJ's
"triple role" as agency, government litigator, and FOIA advisor).
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guidance. 258 Thus, the Committee believes that the FOIA would operate
best if all administrative guidance was controlled by a single agency, but

not the

DOJ.259

It is difficult to predict whether removing FOIA guidance from the
DOJ would increase public access to government information. Although
the DOJ could never compel agencies to implement its guidelines, 26° the
conflict of interest alluded to by the Committee probably has an indirect
impact on access to the extent that agencies incorporate DOJ guidelines
and policies in their day-to-day FOIA operations. Although entrusting
FOIA oversight to the OMB may eliminate some conflicts of interest,
some tension would still remain; the OMB is still an agency that is itself
subject to the burdens of the FOIA.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the most part, FOIA developments in 1990 are not promising
for the American public. Although the New York Times decision was
the most interesting of 1990, in all probability the effect of its impact on
disclosure will be minimal because only the non-lexical information with
privacy implications will be held exempt. By far the most serious threat
to the "freedom of information" is categorical decisionmaking. Even assuming, arguendo, that the Supreme Court did authorize such an approach, it is a harmful (and activist) method by which courts could
potentially create, on a case-by-case basis, a lengthy list of judicial FOIA
exemptions. This alone necessitates a congressional response-preferably an amendment to the FOIA that provides that courts must consider
the facts of each case in their disclosure determination.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's public interest requirement could
potentially become a standard requirement for all FOIA requests, creating an inconsistency in which some courts are more willing than others
to accept a plaintiff's opportunistically asserted interest in knowing what
the government is up to. At a minimum, the requirement would seriously undermine the efforts of many historians and similar researchers.
Finally, although congressional committee opinions may resolve
electronic FOIA issues for some federal agencies, they are not mandates.
In the absence of an explicit statutory policy, agencies are free to imple258. H.R. REP. No. 927, supra note 246, at 65-66.
259. Id. at 66.
260. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1419, supra note 257, at 66 (quoting testimony of Assistant
Attorney General Ralph E. Erikson: "[The DOJ] generally [has] no authority to compel another
agency to comply with a request for its records. Subject to this limitation, the functions of the
Justice Department in [FOIA] matters are [limited to] counseling, coordinating, and representing
other agencies in court.").
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ment their own policies to the detriment of the public. In short, the
FOIA is due for another amending session.

